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STOCK OPTION BACKDATING: THE
SCANDAL, THE MISCONCEPTION & THE
LEGAL CONSEQUENCES
JODELL R. NOwIcKI*
With the barrage of recent corporate scandals, including the
well-publicized fall of Enron,' a recent closer scrutiny of corpo-
rate executive practices has brought to light additional corporate
malfeasance in the form of stock option backdating. 2 This paper
will familiarize and clarify which corporate practices regarding
backdating are legal versus those that are illegal, thereby sub-
jecting companies and individuals to violations of state and fed-
eral law.
I. WHAT IS A STOCK OPTION AND How CAN IT BE BACKDATED TO
CREATE AN ADVANTAGE?
A stock option gives the recipient of the grant the right to buy
a company's stock at a certain exercise or "strike" price. 3 There
* B.S., University of Illinois @ Urbana-Champaign, 2004; J.D., St. John's University
School of Law, 2008.
1 See Edward Iwata, Are Firms' Internal Inquiries Too Cozy?, USA TODAY, May 24,
2007, at 1B (mentioning the Enron accounting scandal); see also Joann S. Lublin & Wil-
liam M. Bulkeley, IBM Ends Director Stock Options, Spotlighting Popular Perk's Decline,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2006, at Al (acknowledging the heavy backlash after big corporate
scandal such as the accounting frauds at Enron Corp and WorldCom Inc).
2 See Adams v. Amdahl, No. C06-0873RSL, slip op. at *3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 12, 2006)
("When plaintiff complains of the 'backdating' of options, the alleged illicit practice is
more thoroughly described as the granting of below-market options to purchase stock and
the failure to report those options as compensation"); see also Patrick Richard et al.,
Commentary, Backdating is Not Always Fraudulent: How to Distinguish Between Lawful
and Fraudulent Ratification, 22 No. 5 ANDREWS CORP. OFF. & DIRECTORS LIAB. LITIG.
REP. 2 (2006) (stating that the 'backdating scandal' . . . [is] about certain directors and
officers who secretly manipulated an otherwise appropriate corporate-governance tech-
nique to hide their true compensation levels from stockholders, regulators and the Inter-
nal Revenue Service").
3 See Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday---Some CEO's Reap Mil-
lions By Landing Stock Options When They Are Most Valuable; Luck---Or Something
Else?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2006 at Al (hereinafter Perfect Payday) (discussing how
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are two types of option grants given to executives, those termed
"at the money"4 and those termed "in the money."5 "At the
money" options are those in which the fair market value of the
stock is assigned to the option on the date the option is granted
to the recipient. 6 The recipient can then only profit if the stock
increases following the grant.7 "In the money" options are those
that have an exercise price below the fair market value at the
time of the grant, and therefore, already have value at the time
of the grant.8 Typically options are granted at the money, with
the value of the stock being set at the current fair market value9
CEO's use stock options effectively); see also Charles Forelle & James Bandler, Dating
Game---Stock-Options Criminal Charge: Slush Fund and Fake Employees --- U.S. Accuses
3 Ex-Executives at Com verse Technology of Long-Running Scheme--- Scrambling to Avoid
Detection, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2006 at Al (hereinafter Slush Fund and Fake Employees)
(noting that stock options "have become the primary form of compensation for many top
executives").
4 See Charles Forelle, KLA Finds Options-Dating Problem --- Internal Probe May Lead
to an Accounting Charge, Restatement of Earnings, WALL ST. J., Jul. 1, 2006 at A3 (de-
scribing "at the money" options); see also Erik Lie, Backdating of Executive Stock Option
(ESO) Grants, http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/elie/backdating.htm (last visited May 26,
2007) (defining that "at the money options" as those usually granted for executive stocks).
5 Charles Forelle & James Bandler, Backdating Probe Widens as 2 Quit Silicon Valley
Firm --- Power Integrations Officials Leave Amid Options Scandal; 10 Companies In-
volved So Far, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2006 at Al (discussing "in the money" options); Wil-
liam B. Mateja & Lezlie B. Willis, Backdating Stock Options: In the Money and Under In-
vestigation: What the Government is Doing and What You Should Do in Response, 22 No.
5 ANDREWS CORP. OFF.. & DIRECTORS LIAB. LITIG. REP. 4 (2006) ('To be completely free
from scrutiny, an option's exercise price should be the same as the fair market value on
the day of the grant.").
6 See Forelle, supra note 4, at A3 (noting that these options were formerly accorded
preferential treatment); see also Lie, supra note 4 (stating that stock options are granted
at the money when "the exercise price of the options is set to equal the market price of the
underlying stock on the grant date.").
I See Forelle, supra note 4, at A3 (explaining that an "at the money" option only has
value if the fortunes of shareholders improve); see also Mateja & Willis, supra note 5 (pos-
iting that the option does not have any inherent value when granted if the exercise price
is "the same as the fair market value on the day of the grant").
8 See Forelle & Bandler, supra note 5, at Al ('[In the money' options [are] those that
carry an exercise price below the market price at the time of the grant."); see also Mateja
& Willis, supra note 5 ("[W]hen options are granted at an exercise price that is lower than
the fair market value of the option at the time of the grant, the option already has some
intrinsic value and is, consequently, 'in the money'... ").
9 See Forelle, supra note 4, at A3 ("Options entitle the recipient to profit when shares
rise above the 'strike price,' normally set to equal the market value on the grant date.");
see also Lie, supra note 4 (explaining that the executive stock options are "usually
granted-at-the money").
STOCK OPTIONBA CKDATING
Stock options have been the primary form of compensation for
executives since the early 1990s, 10 and were originally instituted
to align executives' interests with those of the shareholders.11
The theory was that, by giving executives a stake in the com-
pany's future success, the executives would have additional in-
centive to improve the health and value of the company. 12 Propo-
nents of stock options, such as Frederic W. Cook, a New York
compensation consultant, call the stock option "the most perfect
equity derivative that's ever been invented: It's simple, elegant,
easily understood, and it gives you a little piece of the action."1 3
However, critics advocate the banning of stock options, calling
them the "gold mine that has enriched the world's executive class
by untold billions over the past few decades." 14 The proponents
may have a point when it comes to "at the money" options, as
corporations have wide latitude when it comes to executive com-
pensation. 15 However, with "in the money" options, the executive
made money on paper when he received the grant and, therefore,
the incentive to improve company performance is vastly dimin-
ished.16
10 See Slush Fund and Fake Employees, supra note 3, at Al ("Stock options ... have be-
come the primary form of compensation for many top executives"); see also Steve Steck-
low, Options Study Becomes Required Reading, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2006 at BI ("Com-
panies routinely issue stock options...").
11 See Lublin & Bulkeley, supra note 1, at Al ("Stock options [were] long touted by
many companies as a vital tool for rewarding board members and aligning their interests
with those of shareholders."); see also Mark Maremont & Charles Forelle, Open Spigot:
Bosses' Pay: How Stock Options Became Part of the Problem --. Once Seen as a Reform,
They Grew Into Font of Riches And System to Be Gamed --- Reload, Reprice, Backdate,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2006 at Al ("[Stock options] were the ideal carrot, an incentive for
good work that aligned executives' interests with those of shareholders.").
12 See Slush Fund and Fake Employees, supra note 3, at Al (explaining that stock op-
tions gave "recipients an incentive to make the stock rise and profiting them only if it
does"); see also Stecklow, supra note 10, at Bl (stating that "stock options [were issued] as
an incentive for executives to improve their firms' performance and share prices.").
13 Maremont & Forelle, supra note 11, at Al (quoting one of the numerous defenders of
stock options who say options "shouldn't be judged by a few giant packages").
14 Steve Maich, Why Stock Options Should Be Banned, 37 MACLEAN'S 31, Jan. 1-8,
2007, at 31 (citing author who advocates a complete ban of stock options).
15 See Forelle & Bandler, supra note 3, at Al ("Companies have a right to give execu-
tives lavish compensation if they choose to..."); see also Richard et al., supra note 2, at 2
("Directors have a great deal of discretion over their company's compensation structure..
."1).
16 See Slush Fund and Fake Employees, supra note 3, at Al (describing backdated stock
options as giving the recipient a paper gain right from the start); see also Lublin & Bulke-
ley, supra note 1, at Al (stating that "IBM also believes options tend to make recipients
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"Backdating" occurs when "in the money" options are reported
as "at the money" options; that is, options are actually approved
after the listed grant date, and backdated so it appears that the
options were granted earlier. 17 In other words, the date stamped
on the options grant, or strike price, is not actually the date the
options were approved and signed, but an earlier date that was
picked for its low closing stock price.18 Therefore, when the op-
tions are actually approved, usually by the compensation com-
mittee, they are already in-the-money because they have been
purposely backdated to a date with a lower stock price.
II. Is BACKDATING ILLEGAL?
The real confusion in the scandal stems from the fact that
backdating in and of itself is not illegal. 19 Executives are allowed
to backdate stock options, or any type of resolution, through a
process called ratification, which gives retroactive effect to reso-
lutions passed by the directors' or the board as part of regular
corporate governance. 20 However, the government only allows di-
rectors to retroactively authorize when "proper procedures are
followed and the necessary disclosures are made."21 This is where
a plethora of executives have gotten themselves, and their com-
panies, into major trouble.
more oriented toward short term results than they are with other forms of compensa-
tion.").
17 See Mateja & Willis, supra note 5 (elaborating on in-the-money options and backdat-
ing); see also Lie, supra note 4 (describing backdating).
18 See Adams v. Amdahl, No. C06-0873RSL, slip op. at *8 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 12, 2006)
(discussing how backdated option grants "give an executive the option to purchase stock
in the company at a cost equal to the price of the stock at some arbitrary date in the past,
such as a date during which the price of the stock was low"); see also Slush Fund and
Fake Employees, supra note 3, at Al (describing the strike price set for stock options).
19 See Mateja & Willis, supra note 5 (explaining that "backdated options that have been
properly reported and accounted for are neither illegal nor improper."); see also Corilyn
Shropshire, Black Box Stock Option Backdating Controversy Sheds Light on Practice,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 3, 2006 (revealing that backdating is not illegal and is
defended by advocates).
20 See Kalageorgi v. Kamkin, 750 A.2d. 531, 539 (Del. Ch. 1999) (referring to ratification
as a legal device); see also Richard et al., supra note 2, at 2 (stating that backdating has
"long been a common and useful corporate-housekeeping tool").
21 Richard et al., supra note 2 (citing Kalageorgi v. Victor Kamin, Inc., 750 A.2d 531,
539-40 (Del. Ch. 1999)) (indicating that the "court permitted a board to use the ratifica-
tion device to retroactively authorize a grant of stock shares to the directors themselves,
even though that ratification effectively backdated the directors' stock grants by almost
10 years.").
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In order for backdating to be legal, it must be clearly communi-
cated to shareholders as it creates instant in-the-money profits
for the executive granted the options, and it is the shareholders
who are paying the extra compensation. 22 In order to be commu-
nicated to shareholders, this extra compensation must be prop-
erly reflected as a negative in the earnings expenses under the
accounting rule in effect until 2005.23 Under this rule, at-the-
money options did not have to be reported, unlike in-the-money
options.24 This requirement was frequently not met when compa-
nies failed to report in-the-money options, in effect, pretending
they were at-the-money. As a result, many of the companies un-
der investigation have had to reduce their earnings in restate-
ments to the SEC for past years in order to account for the addi-
tional compensation to executives. 25  This means that
shareholders were buying/selling stock using reported company
earnings numbers that were higher than what the company ac-
tually earned. This resulted because the earnings numbers were
not downwardly adjusted for the additional executive compensa-
tion attributed to the unreported in-the-money options. This, in
effect, perpetuated a fraud on the shareholders. 26 It also caused
22 See Slush Fund and Fake Employees, supra note 3, at Al (quoting the Deputy attor-
ney general as saying that "without honest disclosure, those options are simply theft from
shareholders"); Shropshire, supra note 19 (revealing the SEC's concern about the failure
to disclose backdating to shareholders); Lie, supra note 4 (listing requirements for back-
dating legality).
23 See Forelle & Bandler, supra note 5, at Al (stating that under accounting rules, com-
panies need to report an expense for grants of in the money options which would include
any options backdated to a day when the stock was lower); see also Lie, supra note 4 (out-
lining the in the money options and the corresponding accounting rule).
24 See Erik Lie, Testimony of Erik Lie Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking,
Hous., & Urban Affairs, Sept. 6, 2006 (noting that the Accounting Principles Board (APB)
opinion No. 25, which was phased out in 2005, had the effect that companies did not have
to expense at the money options, only ones that were in the money); see also Lie, supra
note 4 ("Under APB 25, the accounting rule that was in effect until 2005, firms did not
have to expense options at all unless they were in-the-money.").
25 See Maich, supra note 14, at 31 (positing that Monster understated its options costs
by $339.6 million over 6 years and Home Depot, $200 million over 25 years); see also
James Bandler & Robert Tomsho, KLA-Tencor Officials Depart Over Options Dating,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2006, at A2 (explaining that Altera Corporation, as a result of faulty
accounting, will restate its earnings downward by $35.2 million from 1996-2005); Lie, su-
pra note 4 (noting that the new FAS 123R has changed the APB 25 accounting rule as of
2005, so that even at-the-money options need to be expensed).
26 See Mike Rogoway, Feds Plan Backdating Inquiry in Oregon, THE OREGONIAN, Oct.
26, 2006 (stating that "if companies backdate grants without shareholders' permission,
the companies may be committing fraud."); see also Bay Area Federal Task Force Targets
Stock-Option Backdating, 12 No. 20 ANDREWS DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP. 3 (2006) [hereinaf-
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damage to companies, as these executives are paying less to the
company for the stock than they should have.27
Secondly, legal backdating must be reflected in taxes by both
individual executives and the company.28 For the company, in-
the-money options can cause an excess of allowable limits on de-
ductions for the compensation of its executives. 29 Therefore, if the
company treated in-the-money options as being at-the-money
(probably as a result of some type of improper backdating), it is
guilty of violating the tax laws.30 This behavior can subject the
company to an audit, followed by the revocation of large past de-
ductions with interest and penalties added to the totals.31 For in-
dividual executives, having in-the-money instead of at-the-money
ter Bay Area Task Force]. (quoting the San Francisco US Attorney as stating that
"[flalsification or backdating of financial documents ... can constitute fraud on the com-
pany, shareholders and the market.").
27 See Bay Area Task Force, supra note 26 (providing that backdating is a "windfall for
the insider but shortchanges the company itself, which gets paid less for its stock"); see
also Analog Devices Seeks Dismissal of Suit Over Stock-Option Backdating, 22 No. 4
ANDREWS CORP. OFF. & DIRECTORS LIAB. LITIG. REP. 6 (2006) (outlining the suit by
shareholders claiming that when "the recipient pays less to acquire the stock and receives
compensation he or she is not entitled to ... the company also receives less money than it
should.").
28 See Edward Kirk, The Options Backdating Scandal; Did Officers Profit From 'Blind
Luck" or A Rigged System?, PROF'L LIAB. UNDERWRITING SOC'Y JOURNAL (2006), available
at http://www.sdma.comlfiles/Publication/ e522581f-c9le-4cad-b73d-021c732a328a
/Presentation/ PublicationAttachment/4333f591-e194-4478-bfl8-074277aae599
/EKirk%20Reprint.pdf ("Backdating of ESOs is not necessarily illegal if the practice is
clearly communicated to shareholders and properly reflected in earnings and taxes."); see
also Lie, supra note 4 (asserting that backdating must be "properly reflected in taxes").
29 See Mateja & Willis, supra note 5. In the money options may cause the company to
exceed the limits on deducting expenses for executive compensation. Under Section
162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, a public company is allowed to make a tax deduc-
tion up to one million dollars for compensation paid to its CEO and 4 highest-paid officers
other than the CEO with the exception to this if the compensation is "performance based."
In short, at-the-money options are performance based and can be deducted even if they
exceed one million. However, in-the-money options are not exempt from the one million
dollar limit. See also Lie, supra note 4. Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code that
results in at-the-money options being "considered performance-based compensation, and
can be deducted for tax purposes even if executives are paid in excess of $1 million." Id.
"However, if the options were effectively in-the-money on the decision date, they might
not qualify for such tax deductions." Id.
30 See Forelle & Bandler, supra note 5, at Al (noting that companies may be subject to
past income taxes as a result of backdating); see also Mateja & Willis, supra note 5 (point-
ing to the risk of audits, tax disallowance, and potential interest and penalties).
31 See David Cay Johnston, Tech Company Settled Tax Case Without an Audit, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2004, at C1 (stating that Micrel Inc., of San Jose, California, had a back-
dated stock options tax bill calculated to be as much as $58 million from just 3 years); see
also Mateja & Willis, supra note 5 (citing the tax ramifications to companies who have
improperly reported stock options).
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options can also drastically affect their tax bills.32 Therefore, as a
result of unreported backdated options, both the company and
individuals are guilty of tax fraud, prosecutable by the Internal
Revenue Service, 33 and subject to lawsuits from the SEC and in-
dividual shareholders. 34
III. UNVEILING THE SCANDAL
The first to recognize the problem of improper backdating was
David Yermack, a researcher from New York University, who, in
1997, found that stock prices tend to increase following the issu-
ance of stock option grants.35 However, no alarms sounded, as the
first company did not come under attack for the practice until
August 2004.36 The business community first took notice of the
backdating problem when Erik Lie, a University of Iowa re-
searcher released a study in May 2005 of unscheduled executive
32 See Mateja & Willis, supra note 5 (pointing out that Section 409A of the Internal
Revenue Code classifies in-the-money options as "nonqualified deferred compensation"
and subjects the recipient to "significant taxes, penalties, and interest from the date of the
option vesting," and suggesting that since the original options were likely characterized as
being at-the-money, the executive likely never paid the required taxes under 409A); see
also Lie, supra note 4 (commenting that the exercise price affects individual option recipi-
ents).
33 See Eric Dash, Dodging Taxes Is a New Wrinkle in the Stock Options Game, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006, at C1 (positing that "backdating an exercise date can result in tax
fraud"); see also, Lie, supra note 4 (discussing how treating an in-the-money decision as
at-the-money would violate Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code).
34 See Mateja & Willis, supra note 5 (commenting that companies have to face the con-
sequences, including civil lawsuits brought by the government and individuals); see also
Shropshire, supra note 19 (stating that "failing to disclose backdating to shareholders or
reporting for tax purposes" opens the company up to lawsuits).
35 See Mark Maremont, Authorities Probe Improper Backdating of Options---Practice Al-
lows Executives to Bolster Their Stock Gains; A Highly Beneficial Pattern, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 11, 2005 (commenting that Yermack is credited with the earliest research on option-
grant timing); see also Lie, supra note 4 ("He attributed most of this pattern to grant tim-
ing, whereby executives would be granted options before predicted price increases. This
pioneering study was published in the Journal of Finance in 1997."); Stecklow, supra note
10, at B1 ("For years, academics who study corporate finance were aware of a statistical
pattern that showed share prices often rose quickly after options were granted--a paper by
David Yermack, an associate professor of finance at New York University's Stern School
of Business, documented the phenomenon about a decade ago. He and other researchers
speculated the rise might be due to corporate executives who knew that good news was on
the horizon and made sure options were granted beforehand.").
36 See Johnston, supra note 31, at C1 (discussing how Micrel came under fire only be-
cause an IRS whistleblower opened herself up to criminal charges); see also Lie, supra
note 4, (noting IRS auditor turned down a secret deal).
2008]
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stock option awards. 37 Lie found that stock prices fell just before
unscheduled option awards, and stock prices increased after-
ward, suggesting they had been manipulated. 38 The SEC began
to investigate, and the Wall Street Journal picked up the scent
and published its first article highlighting the backdating scan-
dal in November 2005. 39 The scandal then grew exponentially in
the years that followed. 40
From November 2005 to early 2006, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission investigated only about a dozen companies.41
By the end of 2006, the number of companies under suspicion
ballooned to one hundred thirty,42 and either by resignation or
ousting, over thirty top executives have met their departure as a
result.43 This, however, is by no means the end according to some
experts. 44 In a study released in December 2006, researchers at
37 See Geoffrey Colvin, A Study in CEO Greed; How one intrepid academic exposed the
latest stock option scandal, FORTUNE, May 30, 2006, at 53 (highlighting Lie's massive
study of 5,977 option grants between 1992 and 2002); see also Erik Lie, On the Timing of
CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. Sci. 802 (2005).
38 See Perfect Payday, supra note 3, at Al (noting that Lie's study "found that share
prices generally fell before option grants and rose afterward," and that grants were given
at favorable times with grant dates filed retroactively); see also Lie, supra note 37, at 810
(concluding "abnormal stock returns are negative" before unscheduled executive option
awards and positive afterward).
39 See Maremont, supra note 35 (outlining the scandal and the misdeeds of Mercury In-
teractive Corp.); see also Lie, supra note 4 ("Prompted by the Mercury case and other SEC
investigations, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) ran a big story on the issue of backdating
on November 11, 2005.").
40 See Colvin, supra note 37, at 53 (referring to the backdating problem as a "mush-
rooming scandal"); see also Forelle & Bandler, supra note 5, at Al (discussing how "[tihe
stock-options backdating scandal continued to intensify" and noting that the resignations
of the Chairman and CFO of Power Integrations, Inc. were just two of numerous resigna-
tions related to the stock-options-dating matter).
41 See Perfect Payday, supra note 3, at Al (indicating that the SEC is investigating "a
dozen companies' option grants ..."); see also Maremont, supra note 35, at Al (stating
Mercury Interactive Corporation is "one of about a dozen companies" being investigated
by SEC).
42 See Maremont & Forelle, supra note 11, at Al (stating "[a]t least 130 U.S. corpora-
tions" were being investigated for backdating option grants); see also News Release, Cali-
fornia State Senator, Phil Angelides, California Treasurer Angelides Urges Calpers and
Calstrs to Take Tough Action Against KB Home Executives (Nov. 15, 2006), available at
http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/news/releases/2006/20061115_kbhomes.pdf (highlighting that
news reports indicate more than 130 companies were under investigation for improperly
dating option grants).
43 See Dash, supra note 33, at C1 (highlighting as investigation progressed at least 46
executives and directors lost jobs); see also Bandler & Thomsho, supra note 25, at A2 (in-
dicating that by October 2006, more than 30 executives and directors lost their jobs).
44 See generally Lucian Bebchuk et al., Lucky CEOs (John M. Olin Ctr. For Law, &
Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 566, 2006), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu
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Harvard Law School found that about 460 firms (seven percent of
all publicly traded companies), and 1400 outside directors were
associated with events produced by fraudulent backdating of
stock options. 45 While not all of these options were fraudulently
granted, with estimates in the hundreds, the amount of compa-
nies under investigation is likely to extend well beyond a mere
one hundred thirty. At least one research professor needs to
back pedal; in 2006, David Aboody was quoted as stating that
'backdating would be such a 'brazen' attempt to line one's pock-
ets that he'd be surprised if it was widespread." 46 He was
"shocked" that CEOs would steal money from their own compa-
nies and engage in "criminal activity. ' 47 At this point, however,
this type of cock-eyed corporate confidence has no doubt been
dispelled.
According to reports, companies under suspicion have already
been subjected to charges amounting to over $5 billion dollars. 48
Experts predict this figure "is going to get a lot higher."49 This is
no doubt an unsettling fact for most investors, especially since
CFO.com reported that companies caught up in the backdating
/programs/olincenter/papers/pdf/Bebchuk-et%20al_566.pdf (highlighting use of stock op-
tion manipulation was not limited); see also Lucian Bebchuk, et. al., Lucky Directors, at 2
(John M. Olin Ctr. For Law, & Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 573, 2006), available
at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/papers/pdflBebchuket%20al
_573.pdf (noting 9% of all director stock option grants given on days when stock price
equal to monthly low); see also Angelides, supra note 42, at 4 (asserting 130 investigations
in progress "may only be the tip of the iceberg").
45 See Bebchuk, supra note 44 at 2; Eric Dash, Study Finds Outside Directors Also Got
Backdated Options, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2006, at C2 (mentioning study concluded board
members of about 460 companies probably received manipulated options); see also Lublin
& Bulkley, supra note 1, at Al (discussing academic study found as many as 1,400 outside
board members received questionable option grants).
46 Forelle & Bandler, supra note 5, at Al (quoting David Aboody, associate professor at
the Anderson School of Management of University of California).
47 See Maremont, supra note 35, at Al (highlighting skepticism of researcher David
Aboody, that "hundreds of companies" were engaged in "criminal activity"); see also
Charles Forelle, How the Journal Analyzed Stock Option Grants, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18,
2006, at A5 (asserting David Yermack's view that numbers in stock manipulation study
should not be thought of as "precise figures").
48 See Dash, supra note 33, at Cl. "Companies have taken charges totaling $5.3 billion
to account for the impact of improper grants, according to Glass Lewis & Company, a re-
search firm that advises big investors on shareholder issues." Id. Similarly, the San Fran-
cisco Chronicle reported companies were charged 5.2 billion to correct backdating. See
Stephen Taub, The Mounting Costs of Backdating Options (Oct. 26, 2006),
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/8097059?f=search.
49 Taub, supra note 48 (quoting Todd Fernandez, senior research analyst at Glass
Lewis).
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scandal have seen their "collective market capitalizations drop by
$5.1 billion the day after each company announced its exposure
to the problems."50
IV. THE SCANDAL'S MAJOR PLAYERS
There are a variety of schemes attributed to the backdating
scandal, and a number of very prominent companies caught up in
the malfeasance. Among the most prominent has been United-
Health Systems, one of the nation's two largest health insurers
with market capitalization in the billions. 51 It was also one of the
first to be investigated for improper stock option grants.52 The
major red flag for this company was the opportunistic timing of a
grant to its CEO, William McGuire, who received what the Wall
Street Journal describes as "one of the most lucrative stock-
option grants ever."53 The entire package included 14.6 million
options that, if completely exercised today, would be worth about
$756 million. 54 Luckily for McGuire, this grant was dated on the
day UnitedHealth hit its lowest stock price of the year.55 As an
even bigger stroke of luck, options granted to McGuire in 1997
and 2000 were given the price of the stock on the lowest closing
date for those years. 56 Statistics reviewed by a professor of fi-
5o Id. (reporting further findings of Glass Lewis).
51 See Eric Dash & Milt Freudenheim, Chief Executive at Health Insurer Is Forced Out
in Options Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2006 at Al (citing market capitalization for Unit-
edHealth of $66 billion in October 2006); see also Iwata, supra note 1, at 1B (mentioning
large market capitalization of UnitedHealth).
52 See Perfect Payday, supra note 3, at Al (outlining advantageous nature of stock op-
tion grants to UnitedHealth CEO William McGuire); see also Lie, supra note 4 (suggesting
March 18, 2006 Wall Street Journal Article identified UnitedHealth Group as company
that likely backdated options).
3 Perfect Payday, supra note 3, at Al.
5 See id. ("So far, he has exercised about 5% of them, for a profit of about $39 million.
As of late February he had 13.87 million unexercised options left from the October 1999
tranche. His profit on those, if he exercised them today, would be about $717 million
more.'); see also Bill McClellan, Journal Story Builds Case for Crackdown on Stock Op-
tions, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 20, 2006, at B1 (describing McGuire's executive
compensation).
55 See Dash & Freudenheim, supra note 51, at Al (mentioning that 3 of McGuire's op-
tion grants issued were "priced at the stock's lowest price that year"); see also Perfect Pay-
day, supra note 3, at Al ('The 1999 grant was dated the very day UnitedHealth stock hit
its low for the year.").
56 See Dash & Freudenheim, supra note 51, at Al (stating that "among the most sub-
stantial and egregious" options "were those awarded to Dr. McGuire"); see also Perfect
Payday, supra note 3, at Al (highlighting gratuitous grants given to McGuire).
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nance put the odds of such gratuitous timing as exceeding one in
200 million.57 In addition, as a result of the SEC's investigations,
McGuire was forced to resign in October 2006 and dismantle part
of his $1.1 billion dollar stock portfolio. 58 The company has been
forced to restate its earnings in an amount estimated by reports
as ranging from $286 million to $1.6 billion. 59 The company's in-
ternal investigation claims that "inadequate internal controls"
are to blame and that executives were entitled to rely on account-
ing statements. 60
The executives at Comverse Technology had a different idea
about what to do with their stock options; they created a slush
fund of compensation in the form of board-approved backdated
options handed out at will to employees. 61 Employees were cre-
ated out of thin air, and granted options, which were then placed
into the slush fund account.62 When the SEC began to investi-
gate, executives attempted to conceal this fund.63 This was only
57 See Forelle, supra note 47, at Al (detailing David Yermack's findings); see also David
Phelps, SEC Looks at Option Plans like that of UnitedHealth; Fortuitously Timed Stock
Grants Have Drawn Federal Scrutiny, STAR TRIB., Mar. 21, 2006, at 1D ("A finance pro-
fessor at New York University, David Yermack, said the odds of picking those days when
the stock was that depressed were 'astronomical."').
5 See Dash & Freudenheim, supra note 51, at Al (discussing McGuire's portfolio and
forced resignation); see also James P. Miller, Arrow from the Heartland Wounds Corporate
America, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 3, 2006, at 1 (commenting on McGuire's resignation).
69 See Dash & Freudenheim, supra note 51, at Al ("UnitedHealth said in May that re-
stating could cut as much as $286 million from profits for 2003, 2004 and last year."); see
also Iwata, supra note 1, at 1B (reporting that "UnitedHealth announced a $1.6 billion
restatement"); see also Maremont & Forelle, supra note 11, at Al (stating that United-
Health "said it will have to restate past earnings by as much as $1.7 billion.").
60 See Dash & Freudenheim, supra note 51, at Al (describing internal investigative
findings); see also Forelle & Bandler, supra note 5, at Al (mentioning UnitedHealth's
statement of their internal probe).
61 See Slush Fund and Fake Employees, supra note 3, at Al (detailing Comverse's slush
fund and how it was "populated"); see also Law Firms Fight for Lead Role in Coiverse
Backdating Suits, 22 No. 5 ANDREWS CORP. OFF. & DIRECTORS LIAB. LITIG. REP. 12 (2006)
(stating shareholders' claims that "the defendants knowingly made material misstate-
ments and omissions regarding the actual dates of stock-option grants").
62 See Slush Fund and Fake Employees, supra note 3, at Al (describing "the slush fund"
and how "dozens of phony employee names" were created that allowed for "[h]undreds of
thousands of options" to be "approved with no real recipient"); see also Edward Iwata,
Lawyer to Pay $3.1M over Comverse Stock Options, USA TODAY, Jan. 10, 2007, at 5B (out-
lining Comverse's slush fund scheme).
63 According to the FBI, Comverse omitted the page about the slush fund options when
submitting documentation to auditors. In addition, an executive also attempted to change
the date when the slush fund was closed, and cover it up by trying to reverse it and mak-
ing minor changes to "every account record, to cover up his tampering." Slush Fund and
Fake Employees, supra note 3, at Al. "According to court filings, Alexander and Kreinberg
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the tip of the iceberg when it came to company's founder, Kobi
Alexander, and the backdating scam at Comverse. Executives
were also personally receiving millions in backdated options as
compensation. 64 The FBI proceeded to file charges against Alex-
ander for the scheme after the SEC calculated the extra profits
(and cost to the company) on one option grant was $130 million
for recipients. 65 Charges were also filed against the company's
lawyer, William Sorin, and its CFO, David Kreinberg. 66
The scam apparently worked with Alexander initially deciding
to grant options, next choosing a favorable grant date at a low
stock price, and then, inciting other executives to trick the com-
pensation committee into signing the approval documents for the
backdated grants. 67 In the FBI's investigation, the compensation
committee claimed they "did not intend to grant in-the-money op-
manufactured evidence to defend the options grants and deceived Comverse directors and
auditors. Prosecutors alleged that Comverse set up a roster of phony grant recipients la-
beled 'I.M. Fanton' after a secretary saw The Phantom of the Opera." Iwata, supra note
62, at 5B.
64 See Slush Fund and Fake Employees, supra note 3, at Al ("The SEC said options
were distributed 'company-wide."'); see also News Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., Former Ex-
ecutives of Comverse Technology Inc. Charged with Backdating Millions of Stock Options
and Creating a Secret Stock Options Slush Fund, 2006 WL 2377912 at *1-3 (Aug. 9, 2006)
[hereinafter U.S. Dep't of Just. On Comverse Backdating] (describing how Comverse
fraudulently backdated options).
65 See Slush Fund and Fake Employees, supra note 3, at Al (mentioning that charges
were filed against in-house counsel William Sorin, company founder Kobi Alexander and
CFO David Kreinberg); see also Frank Reynolds, Comverse Ex-Execs Second to Face
Criminal Backdating Charges, 12 No. 20 ANDREWS DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP. 4 (2006)
("[P]rosecutors charge that Alexander alone reaped a $138 million profit from his options
and that $6.4 million of that profit came from backdating ... ").
66 See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Former Comverse Technology,
Inc. CEO, CFO, and General Counsel in Stock Option Backdating Scheme (Aug. 9, 2006),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-137.htm [hereinafter SEC Charges Former
Comverse CEO] (reporting charges and allegations against Jacob Alexander, William F.
Sorin, and David Kreinberg); see also U.S. Dep't of Just. On Comverse Backdating, supra
note 64, at *1 (stating that there were charges filed against three Comverse executives for
"fraudulently backdating options and operating a secret stock options slush fund").
67See Slush Fund and Fake Employees, supra note 3, at Al (noting that after Alexander
decided it was time to grant options, Sorin, the company attorney, would call the compen-
sation committee to say that "options-granting paperwork was on its way," however, there
was no place for the members to date their signatures, and the FBI said in some cases,
"directors didn't sign the forms until weeks or months after the purported grant date");
see also Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Settles Options Backdating Case
Against William Sorin, Former General Counsel of Comverse Technology, Inc. (Jan. 10,
2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-4.htm (last visited May 24, 2007) [here-
inafter SEC Settles Options Backdating Case](delineating the SEC's charges that allege
that Sorin falsified records in order to perpetuate the backdating scheme).
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tions."68 The FBI maintains that the backdating scheme at the
company ran over a decade from 1991 to 2002, with the company
consequentially materially overstating its net income and earn-
ings during that time. 69 During those years, Alexander person-
ally gained over $6 million from the backdated grants alone.70
Alexander initially denied the backdating and any wrongdoing,
but by the Wall Street Journal's analysis, denial is fruitless as
the "odds of the grant dates falling as they did purely by chance
[were] around one in six billion. ' 71 According to the FBI, Alexan-
der changed his tune, and tried to justify his actions by claiming
that everyone was "doing it."72 The company is now forced to re-
state its earnings.7 3
The FBI and SEC have not hesitated to follow through in the
Comverse case. Kreinberg was the first in the backdating scan-
dal to reach a civil/criminal plea and SEC settlement in October
2006 in which he agreed to pay almost $2.4 million in disgorge-
ment, and pled guilty to criminal charges including securities
fraud. 74 William Sorin was sentenced to a year and day in prison
68 Slush Fund and Fake Employees, supra note 3, at Al (citing an FBI affidavit where
two committee members insisted that "they didn't realize the grant carried a lower trad-
ing price").
69 See Slush Fund and Fake Employees, supra note 3, at Al (stating that "at least 26
stock-option grants" were improperly backdated from 1991-2001); see also SEC Charges
Former Cornverse CEO, supra note 66 (citing Comverse's material financial overstate-
ments); see also Nightly Business Report (Cmty. Television Found. Of S. Florida television
broadcast Aug. 9, 2006), available at http://www.pbs.org/nbr/site/onair/transcripts
/060809b/ (indicating the charge of prosecutors for backdating between 1991 and 2005).
70 See SEC Charges Former Comverse CEO, supra note 66 (putting Alexander's actual
gains from stock options at $138 million); see also Nightly Business Report, supra note 69
(reporting Alexander's fraudulent profits).
71 Slush Fund and Fake Employees, supra note 3, at Al (noting that all but one of Alex-
ander's grants between 1994 and 2001 were dated just before a "sharp run-up in company
shares").
72 See Slush Fund and Fake Employees, supra note 3, at Al (stating Alexander defend-
ing the backdating "on the ground that everyone in high technology was 'doing it"'); see
also Reynolds, supra note 65, at 4 (quoting Alexander as saying "everyone in the Silicon
Valley was doing it [backdating]").
73 See Law Firms Fight for Lead Role in Comverse Backdating Suits, supra note 61, at
12 (describing a civil lawsuit that alleges defendants "knowingly violated federal securi-
ties laws by overstating the company's financial situation from 2001 through 2006"); see
also SEC Charges Former Comverse CEO, supra note 67 (stating that earnings were ma-
terially overstated between 1991-2002).
74 See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, David Kreinberg, Former CFO of Comverse
Technology, Inc., Agrees to Settle SEC Charges in options Backdating Case (Oct. 24, 2006),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-180.htm. The settlement also in-
cluded a permanent injunction, a permanent officer and director's bar, and suspension
from appearing or practicing before the SEC as an accountant. Kreinberg, in a deal with
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for his role in the scandal, and ordered to pay $3.1 million in dis-
gorgement to the SEC. 75 The company's founder took the high
road in taking responsibility for his involvement and fled to Na-
mibia, Africa, and attempted to conceal funds by transferring
more than $57 million to accounts in Israel.7 6 The U.S. is cur-
rently seeking to extradite him, as Alexander has already been
indicted on charges of fraud and conspiracy, among other
things. 77 Collectively, the backdating scandal has cost Comverse
$51.8 million dollars, an amount that must be paid back to the
company according to a judicial order.78
Other players in the stock options backdating scam were the
top executives at Brocade Communications, a telecommunica-
tions company based in California.7 9 Former CEO, Gregory
Reyes, and former VP of human resources, Stephanie Jensen,
have been federally indicted for defrauding Brocade, its Board,
the US Attorney's Office in New York, pled guilty to "one criminal count of conspiracy to
commit securities fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud, and one criminal count of securities
fraud." See Martha Graybow, Ex-Comverse lawyer gets prison time for backdating,
REUTERS, May 12, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/technology-media-
telco-SP/idUSN104311252007051i. This article mentions Kreinberg's guilty plea to con-
spiracy and securities fraud.
75 See Bloomberg News, Wall Street Roundup; Prison sentence in backdating scandal,
L.A. TIMES, May 11, 2007 (reporting Sorin's prison sentence and SEC settlement); see also
Comverse Exec Sentenced in Options Case, BOSTON GLOBE, May 10, 2007, available at
http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2007/05/10/comverse-exec-sentenced-
in-options-case/ (citing Sorin's guilty plea to conspiracy and his prison sentence).
76 See Graybow, supra note 74 (stating that Alexander is considered a fugitive); see also
Slush Fund and Fake Employees, supra note 3, at Al (describing the allegations of con-
cealing $57 million in funds); see also U.S. Dep't of Just., supra note 64 (describing the
American government's seizure of $45 million for Alexander's participation in fraudulent
stock options and "money laundering scheme involving the secret transfer of more than
$57 million to accounts in Israel in an effort to conceal the funds from US authorities).
77 See Comverse Exec Sentenced in Options Case, supra note 75. Alexander has cur-
rently "been indicted on charges of conspiracy, securities fraud, making false filings with
the SEC, mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering and engaging in unlawful monetary
transactions." Graybow, supra note 74. Alexander is located in Namibia pending a U.S.
extradition request.
78 See Comverse Exec Sentenced in Options Case, supra note 75 (indicating that while
Sorin is joint and severally liable for the $51.8 million cost to the company, the implemen-
tation of the order has been stayed); see also Graybow, supra note 74 (citing the judge's
order of restitution).
79 See Nicholas Rummell, Feds Get New Life in Brocade Backdating, WORKFORCE
MGMT., May 22, 2007 (describing the case against telecom company Brocade); see also Ed
Sutherland, Former Brocade Execs Charged in Stock Scandal (July 21, 2006), available at
http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/print.php/3621681 (stating that Brocade manu-
factures computer gear).
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shareholders, auditors and the public.80 The allegations are that
Reyes and Jensen backdated $100 million in stock options be-
tween 2000 and 2004.81 Although Reyes and Jensen didn't per-
sonally profit from any of the options,8 2 the court has refused to
dismiss their indictments.8 3 The pair of executives backdated the
dates of board meeting minutes so that on paper it showed that
options were granted on dates with low stock prices, when in re-
ality there were no meetings or grants on those dates.8 4 The pair
also backdated employment offer letters so new employees could
be granted options before they were even hired.8 5 The real fraud
occurred when Reyes and Jensen perpetuated this scheme on
80 See Patrice Hill, Brocade Officers Hit With Fraud Complaint; SEC Probe Finds Mis-
handling of Stock Options, WASH. TIMES, Jul. 21, 2006, at C08 (discussing the indictments
of Brocade executives for securities fraud). See generally Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Reyes,
2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings 4435 (2006) (outlining the criminal complaint against Bro-
cade executives).
81 See Howard Mintz, Judge Rejects Bid To Toss Out Charges, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, May 11, 2007 (indicating the number of backdated options to be over $100 million);
see also Howard Mintz, Novel Options Defense Falls Flat, Brocade Ex-CEO's Lawyer:
Backdating Is Not "Material,' SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 12, 2007, at 1C (mentioning
the systematic backdating of options totaling more than $100 million).
82 See Jessica Guynn, U.S. Attorney Not Letting Up On Backdating: Interim S.F. Leader
Says He Will Maintain Task Force That Is Investigating Stock Options, S.F. CHRON., Apr.
5, 2007, at C1 (explaining that attorneys for Reyes and Jensen argue that they did not
personally profit from backdating options); see also Howard Mintz, Novel Options Defense
Falls Flat, Brocade Ex-CEO's Lawyer: Backdating Is Not "Material,' SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, May 12, 2007, at 1C (reporting that even though Reyes and Jensen were not ac-
cused of any personal profit from the backdated options, the "government maintains their
alleged efforts to conceal the backdating demonstrate they were aware they were break-
ing the law and accounting rules").
83 See Mintz, supra note 81 (discussing Federal Judge Charles Breyer's refusal to dis-
miss the indictments against Reyes and Jensen just because they didn't personally profit
from the backdated stock options, and further refusal to uphold the argument that back-
dating is not material and "investors do not consider backdating and concealing the prac-
tice from auditors an important factor in assessing a company's performance"); see also
Mintz, supra note 82 at C1 (noting the federal judge's rejection of the materiality argu-
ment and the SEC's fear that its success could "undercut government efforts to press
charges related to backdating in other cases.").
84 See generally PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, Stock Option Pricing Practice: What you
Need to Know, 1574 PLI/Corp 247 (2006) (outlining the sly behavior of Brocade execu-
tives); Frank Reynolds, Brocade Execs Plead Not Guilty to Backdating Charges, 22 No. 5
ANDREWS CORP. OFF. & DIRECTORS LIAB. LITIG. REP. 5 (2006) (explaining the indictment's
allegations that Reyes allegedly instructed Jensen to prepare false documents to show
that options were granted at specific committee meetings of a given date).
85 See PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 84, at 257 (noting that Brocade back-
dated offer letters to potential employees); see also Reynolds, supra note 84 (discussing
that Brocade went so far as to backdate employment letters to grant options to people who
were not yet employed).
2008]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY
outside auditors, thus creating misleading SEC statements.8 6 The
executives plead "not guilty" to the charges.8 7 As a result of the
scandal, Brocade has been forced to restate its financial state-
ments from 1999 through 2004.88
One of the most high profile incidents of backdating involved
Apple Computers and its CEO, Steve Jobs. An initial internal
investigation cleared Jobs of any wrongdoing, but the findings re-
leased were not exactly complete.8 9 The company failed to report
that Jobs was the recipient of 7.5 million backdated options in
2002, which constituted two percent of the entire number of out-
standing shares at that time.90 Company records were falsified to
cover up that options had been backdated by two months, and
left unreported in company documentation. 91 Although Apple
proclaims Job's accomplishments for the company, and he is
widely known as a "visionary,"92 he is far from the ideal executive
most investors are seeking. 93
86 See Mateja & Willis, supra note 5 (mentioning the conscious violation of laws and ac-
counting rules by Reyes and Jensen); see also PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 84,
at 258-59 (citing the false and misleading statements to auditors and to the SEC).
87 See Reynolds, supra note 84 (reporting that Reyes' attorney stated that his client is
innocent and "the government made a mistake by seeking an indictment of Mr. Reyes.");
see also Chris Williams, Ex-Brocade pair plead not guilty, THE REGISTER, Aug., 31, 2006,
available at http://www.theregister.co.uk2006/08/31/reyes-pleads/print.html (document-
ing the not guilty pleas of Jensen and Reyes to mail and securities fraud charges).
88 See Sutherland, supra note 79 (explaining that Brocade had to revise its financial
statements for the years 1999 through 2004); see also Williams, supra note 87 (outlining
the accusations against Brocade that include misleading the market).
89 See Lucian Bebchuk, Inside Jobs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2007, at A6 (reporting that Ap-
ple's internal report says little about what executives knew about backdating); see also
Gene Munster, What Counts Are iPod Sales, ONLINE REPORTER (USA), Jan. 6, 2007 at 24
(noting that an internal report from Apple cleared Jobs against allegations of backdating).
90 See John Heilemann, Steve Jobs's Halo, N.Y. MAG., Jan. 8, 2007, available at
http://www.nymag.com/news/politics/powergrid/26302 (indicating that that Apple com-
pany records were falsified to cover up backdating); see also Colleen Taylor, SEC Backdat-
ing Charges Against Former Apple CFO, General Counsel, ELECTRONIC NEWS, Apr. 30,
2007 (explaining that there was a grant of 7.5 million options to Jobs, who altered com-
pany records to disguise fraud).
91 See Heilemann, supra note 90 (adding that another grant to Jobs' was backdated 6
days in 2000 and that was "greatly to his advantage"); see also Arik Hesseldahl, Apple's
Options Overdose, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 18, 2006, available at http://www.businessweek.com
/technology/contentlaug2006/tc20060817_404045.htm?chan=search (noting that Apple's
"irregularities" in reporting options coincided with Jobs' return to the company).
92 See Lev Grossman, Steve Jobs., TIME MAG., May 14, 2007, at 160 (referring to Steve
Jobs as the "visionary founder... at Apple and Pixar").
93 See Editorial, Fallen Icons: Low-Brow High-Tech, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2006, at 16. "All
the same, the practice of secretly backdating options is antithetical to public companies
because it cheats investors ... Jobs need only look a few miles up the freeway to HP and
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Other companies wrapped up in the scandal include Mercury
Communications and Affiliated Computer Services. Mercury's
Chief Executive and other top officials were forced to resign after
an internal investigation found that they personally benefited
from "widespread manipulation of stock-option grant[s]," and the
company will be forced to restate it's past earnings results to at
least 2002. 94 Affiliated's CEO, Jeffrey Rich, made good on his
name when he reaped the benefits of timely dated stock options. 95
In a pattern of stock option grants calculated by the Wall Street
Journal, Rich received six stock option grants between 1995 and
2002 that were all dated before a large rise in Affiliated stock.96
Rich calls this "blind luck," but a conservative estimation by the
Wall Street Journal puts the odds of this happening at one in 300
billion.97 According to company estimates, Affiliated needs to re-
port $51 million in additional compensation expenses relating to
the backdating scheme. 98
see that, when scandal comes, the corporation is more likely to survive than its chief." Id;
see Jim Pavia, The Options' Buck Stops at the SEC, INv. NEWS, Jun. 18, 2007, at 10. "Let
the recent settlements deliver a clear message: The SEC will not tolerate corporate execu-
tives who cheat investors and undermine public confidence in the capital markets. Id.
94 See Maremont, supra note 35, at Al (citing problems plaguing Mercury Interactive
Corporation due to executive manipulation of stock-grant options and stating "Mercury
has said it will need to restate its past results back to at least 2002 due to the options-
timing problems"); see also Eric Dash, Who Signed Off On Those Options?, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 27, 2006, at 1 (discussing how Mercury's directors kept "backdating ball rolling"
rather than keeping such practices in check and further emphasizing that "[a]ll three ex-
ecutives resigned abruptly last fall").
95 See Perfect Payday, supra note 3, at Al (noting impeccable timing of Rich's stock op-
tion grants); see also Katie Dean, Affiliated Computer Executives Exit, TheStreet.com
(Nov. 27, 2006), http://www.thestreet.com/newsanalysis/techsoftware/10324356.html
(stating that Rich frequently "used hindsight to select favorable grant dates").
96 See Perfect Payday, supra note 3, at A. Article notes the "striking pattern" of Rich's
stock option grants. Id. See also Dean, supra note 95. The scheme of Rich and other execu-
tives was designed so that grants were "intentionally misdated ... to make it appear as if
the memoranda had been created at or about the time of the chosen grant date, when in
fact, they had been created afterwards." Id. Affiliated then "effectively granted 'in the
money' options without recording the appropriate compensation expense." Id.
91 See Gerard Baker, Five Years After Enron, Culture of Greed is Back; American View,
TIMES (U.K.), Jun. 20, 2006, at 45. "When Mr. Rich was asked to explain the suspiciously
good timing of his company's options issuance, he told The Wall Street Journal that it had
been 'blind luck"'. Id.; see also Perfect Payday, supra note 3, at Al. To put these odds in
perspective, the article compares them with odds of winning multistate Powerball lottery,
about one in 146 million. Perfect Payday, supra note 3, at Al.
98 See Markets, Wall St. Roundup, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2006, at 4 (describing resigna-
tions of chief officers due to violations of ethics rules regarding granting of stock options
and declaring that Affiliated would record " ... about $51 million in additional compensa-
tion expenses to correct the accounting of misdated option grants"); see also Dean, supra
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This brief sampling of companies is barely the icing on the
cake. Nevertheless, the widespread and disturbing nature of the
problem is glaringly evident.
V. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF BACKDATING
A. Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty
With the barrage of companies and executives subjected to
numerous investigations surrounding millions of stock options,
the legal implications of the executives' participation and fault
are likely significant. When a corporate director assumes his
leadership position, he is required to fulfill certain duties,
namely, a strict duty of loyalty to the company. 99 The duty of loy-
alty consists of the director's requirement to put the interests of
the company before his own interests and to avoid situations
where any potential self-interest conflicts with the interests of
the company. 100 According to Bruce Marks, "[a] director or officer
note 95 (stating further that "[t]he company has not yet determined the impact of these
accounting adjustments on its historical and current period consolidated financial state-
ments ... nor whether it will be required to restate its consolidated financial statements
as a result of these adjustments...").
- See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(i) (2007). "A provision eliminating or
limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for mone-
tary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director... : (i) For any breach of the direc-
tor's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders... " Id. However, for purposes
of this article, since personal liability for breaches of this duty, in many states, can be re-
leased by provisions in a company's charter, it will not be analyzed. See, e.g., Bernard S.
Black, Stanford Law Sch. Professor, The Principal Fiduciary Duties of Boards of Direc-
tors, Presentation at Third Asian Roundtable on Corporate Governance, Singapore, Apr.
4, 2001, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/53/1872746.pdf. The directors also
owe the company a fiduciary duty of care to "pay attention and to try to make good deci-
sions." Id. If the duty of care is met, a court will not interfere in decisions of directors and
officers because the business judgment rule prevents courts from second-guessing deci-
sions that turn out poorly. Id; see Mark R. High, Dickinson Wright PLLC-Attorneys, Dis-
ney and the 140 Million Dollar Man, (October 2005), available at
http://www.dickinsonwright.comlnews2.asp?id=136&action-flag-edit. The author de-
scribes Delaware General Corporation Law, which allows company charters to release
executives "from personal liability for breaches of the duty of care." See Nat'l Assoc. of
Veterans' Research and Educ. Found., Duty of Care, Loyalty and Obedience,
http://www.navref.org/bestpractices/gov-bod-responsibilities-duties.htm (last visited Oct.
31, 2007). Duty of care is a "standard that requires a board member to exercise the same
care that an ordinary prudent person would exercise in a like position or under similar
circumstances." Id.
100 See, e.g., Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1944) ('The fiduciary
must subordinate his individual and private interests to his duty to the corporation
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has the fiduciary obligation to work for the benefit of the corpora-
tion and any activity to the detriment of the corporation by a di-
rector is contrary to this duty."10 1 A simple way to comply is to
not engage in any "self-dealing transactions". 10 2 In most states, if
there is a director conflict-of-interest, the decision of the board
must be ratified by disinterested directors or by shareholders in
order for it not to be a void or voidable transaction. 10 3
If it is established that there is no director conflict of interest,
directors and officers can still be held liable for breaches of the
duty of loyalty if they acted in bad faith, as the duty of loyalty re-
quires actions by directors and board members to be in good
faith.104 In re the Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation,
and in a recent decision in Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme-
Court clarified the duty of good faith as not rising to the level of
whenever the two conflict."); see also Julius J. Brecht, Directors have a 'Duty of Loyalty,
ALASKA J. COMM., Jun. 30, 2002, available at http://alaskajournal.com/stories/063002
/weajloyalty-duty.shtml (defining duty of loyalty as "basic to corporate governance"); see
Nat'l Assoc. of Veterans' Research and Educ. Found., supra note 99 (requiring directors to
put interests of organization above self-interest). See generally Black, supra note 99 (stat-
ing that the same fiduciary duties apply to both corporate directors and officers).
101 Bruce D. Marks, When to Go For It: The Duty of Loyalty, (2001), available at
http://www.lawworldwide.com/Duty%20of/2OLoyalty.htm (last visited October 31, 2007).
"This ties directly to the concept that a director of the corporation has an obligation to not
compete against the corporation to the detriment of the corporation." Id.
102 See Peter C. Kostant, Exit, Voice and Loyalty in the Course of Corporate Governance
and Counsel's Changing Role, 28 J. Socio-ECON. 203 (1999) (defining board of directors as
having virtually absolute power " ... as long as directors do not violate their duty of loy-
alty to the entity by engaging in tainted self-dealing"); see also Black, supra note 99 (ex-
plaining that steering clear of "'self-dealing' transactions" is the "easiest way to comply
with this duty [of loyalty]").
103 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2007) (mandating disclosure of material facts
as to conflict of interest); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-8 (West 2007) (allowing corpo-
rations to void transactions that contain conflict of interest if transaction wasn't fair, or if
there was failure to appropriately disclose information to disinterested directors or share-
holders); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 2007) (requiring good faith disclosure of
facts relating to conflict of interest, and if lacking, corporation may void the contract
unless the party can affirmatively establish that contract or transaction was fair and rea-
sonable to corporation when it was approved by the board, committee or shareholders).
104 See Posting of Stephen M. Bainbridge to Law and Business blog,
http://www.businessassociationsblog.com/lawandbusiness/comments/ryan-v-gifford-chan
dlertackles-stock-options/ (Feb. 7, 2007) (defining bad faith where "the fiduciary inten-
tionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the corpora-
tion" or where "the fiduciary acts with intent to violate applicable positive law" or where
"the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of known duty to act, demonstrating a
conscious disregard for his duties"). See generally Kostant, supra note 102, at 203 (high-
lighting that directors are immune from liability as long as they are not acting in self-
interest or in bad faith).
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the duty of loyalty, but as a subordinate element of the duty.10 5
The court, in Stone, states that bad faith can be shown where,
"the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of
advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduci-
ary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or
where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the fact of known
duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his du-
ties."10 6 While failure to act in good faith is not "ipso facto" a
breach of the duty of loyalty, bad faith can demonstrate a "con-
scious disregard" of responsibilities and breach the duty of loy-
alty. 107
In Stone, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the standard
established in Caremark is the applicable standard for "assessing
director oversight liability."108 This standard outlines the "neces-
sary conditions predicate" to such liability including: "a) the di-
rectors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information
system or controls; or b) having implemented such a system or
controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations
thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or prob-
lems requiring their attention." 10 9 For either to be established,
the officer must have had knowledge that they were breaking
105 See High, supra note 99 (analyzing whether duty of good faith "is a separate duty
owed by directors or is an integral part of the duties of loyalty and care"); see also Peter
Golden, Fried Frank, LLP, Delaware Supreme Court Finds No Basis for Personal Liability
of Directors for Alleged Failure to Supervise Employees and Addresses Duty of Good Faith
(Nov. 14, 2006), http://www.ffhsj.com/siteFiles/ffFiles/061114_delsupreme-ct~liability.pdf
(describing good faith as "subsidiary element" of duty of loyalty); see also Andrew M.
Johnston et al., Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Delaware Supreme Court Addresses
Director Oversight Liability, Clarifies the Obligation to Act in Good Faith (Nov. 13, 2006),
http://www.mnat.com/assets/attachments/94.pdf (discussing "interplay" between good
faith and duty of loyalty).
106 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006).
107 Id. at 369-70 (explaining that acting in good faith is not a separate fiduciary duty,
but an element of the duty of loyalty); see Golden, supra note 105 (commenting that under
Stone breach of duty of good faith may indirectly lead to a finding of fiduciary liability if
such conduct results in breach of duty of loyalty); see also Johnston et al., supra note 105
(citing Stone court's explanation of the interplay between good faith and duty of loyalty
and warning directors that, while good faith may not be considered a separate fiduciary
duty, courts consider it linked to the duty of loyalty).
108 Johnston, supra note 105 (quoting Stone that 'Caremark articulates the necessary
conditions for assessing director oversight liability.'); see also Golden, supra note 105 (ob-
serving that Delaware Supreme Court in Stone approved Caremark standard after re-
viewing case law on director liability for ignorance of conduct which created corporate li-
ability and loss).
109 Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (articulating the standard set forth in Caremark for the im-
position of director oversight liability).
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their fiduciary duties by "failing to discharge that fiduciary obli-
gation in good faith."110
Once the fiduciary duty of loyalty is breached, executives be-
come personally liable for any harm to the company that resulted
from such a breach. 11' Even if they have an insurance policy cov-
ering their liability, coverage does not extend to the damages
that result from the directors' breach of the duty of loyalty, in-
cluding "intentionally dishonest or criminal acts, willful viola-
tions of law, or profit gained by a person who is not legally enti-
tled to receive it."112 In addition, insurance companies can cancel
policies if the company or applicant director made any misrepre-
sentations in any applications. 1 3 This would include, according
to Mark High, "inaccurate financial statements, even if believed
to be accurate when submitted."'114
In addition, under ordinary circumstances, directors are usu-
ally entitled to indemnification by the company for costs incurred
in litigation and damages awarded while at the helm.11 5 How-
ever, indemnification provisions under DGCL §145 allow indem-
nity only "if the person acted in good faith and in a manner the
person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best in-
o10 Id. (explaining that a director breaches a duty of loyalty by not acting where there is
a known duty to act, because such conduct demonstrates blatant disregard for responsi-
bilities and lack of good faith).
M1 See High, supra note 99 (stating that under Delaware General Corporation Law
("DGCL") Sec. 102(b)(7) the "release from personal liability is not available for breaches of
a director's duty of loyalty . . . nor for acts or omissions not performed in good faith"); see
also Johnston, supra note 105 (noting that under DGCL §102(b)(7) "[d]irectors cannot be
exculpated under a limitation on liability provision . . . for breaches of the duty of loy-
alty.").
112 High, supra note 99 (generalizing traditional director and officer insurance policies);
see also Law of Corp. Officers & Dir.: Idemn. & Ins. §8.10 (Nov. 2007) (noting that there is
some variation in way director and officer policies treat claims against directors and offi-
cers for alleged acts of bad faith, dishonesty, knowing violations of law, or acts for ille-
gitimate personal gain, but generally these types of acts are not covered).
113 See High, supra 99 (noting that if insurer finds a misrepresentation was made in di-
rector's liability insurance application, policy can be rescinded); see also Emily A. Moseley
et al., Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, Directors and Officers' Liability Insurance (June 2001),
http://www.kilpatrickstockton.com/publications/article-detail.aspx?ID=940 (commenting
that most states require, by statute, that insurance policies be voided if misrepresenta-
tions, even innocent ones, were made on insurance application).
114 High, supra note 99.
115 See 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations §1645 (2007). Most states allow corporations to
indemnify any person who is sued for conduct pursuant to their position as director or of-
ficer of the corporation. See High, supra 99. Under Delaware law, directors of Disney Cor-
poration could have been denied indemnification if court found they had failed to act in
good faith.
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terests of the corporation... ",116 Therefore, any breach of the
duty of loyalty would prevent indemnification of the directors, po-
tentially resulting in significant personal liability.
Whether or not there is a conflict of interest, when stock op-
tions are backdated without proper disclosure, regardless of
whether the failure to disclose was in accounting, or in taxes,
there is a breach of the executives' fiduciary duty of loyalty.11 7
However, the case for breach of the duty of loyalty is strongest
when executives personally benefited from backdated grants.
When an executive is the recipient of self-manipulated, undis-
closed, backdated stock option grants, there is a clear conflict of
interest and obvious self-dealing. The executive instantly and
personally profits from setting earlier grant dates at the expense
of the company, as the company receives less for the stock than it
should, and dilutes the amount of stock on the market.118 To
avoid breaching his duty of loyalty, the executive must make full
disclosure and get the approval of disinterested directors.119 In
most cases, however, the disclosures were never made and the
options were, in fact, manipulated on paper to look like at-the-
money grants. 20
This is the case with companies such as UnitedHealth, Com-
verse Technology and Apple Computers. 121 The CEO at United
Health received a stock option plan worth millions with the
116 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2007); see High, supra note 99 (noting that DGCL §145
limits director indemnification to acts taken in good faith).
117 See supra notes 21, 23, & 28 and corresponding text (explaining that backdating of
options becomes an issue, and potentially illegal, when the backdating is not disclosed to
shareholders, in accounting reports, or in tax reports).
118 See American Tower Corp. Execs Face Suit Over Options Backdating, 22 No. 5
ANDREWS CORP. OFF. & DIRECTORS LIAB. LITIG. REP. (2006) (referring to the immediate
gain realized by recipients of backdated options as "paper profit[s]"); see also Analog De-
vices Seeks Dismissal of Suit Over Stock-Option Backdating, supra note 27, at 6 (inferring
that the company receives less for its stock when options are backdated); Bay Area Fed-
eral Task Force Targets Stock-Option Backdating, supra note 26, at 3 (stating that the
company gets short-changed by being paid less).
119 See supra note 103 and corresponding text for discussion of state law in this area of
the finance industry; see also Dash, supra note 45, at C2. According to a study done by
Harvard Law School program on corporate governance, 1400 outside directors themselves
may have received manipulated grants over the past decade. This suggests that many of
the boards may not have had any disinterested directors in many cases, if even the out-
side directors were conflicted. Therefore, ratification may have been impossible for some
boards, even if full disclosure was made.
120 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing backdating manipulation).




chances of it occurring by accident, that is, not manipulated, cal-
culated to exceed one in 200 million or greater. 122 The company
was forced to make restatements with some reports reaching $1.6
billion.123 The fact of the restatements alone suggests a breach of
the fiduciary duty. The CEO clearly failed to put the corpora-
tion's interests first when he effectively stole from the company
in the form of gratuitously granted options which were unre-
ported to the SEC until the scandal was uncovered.
Comverse Technology was an even more egregious example
when executives created a slush fund of options that the founder
tried to conceal by changing its closing date. 24 Executives at the
company also personally benefited from backdated options, again
creating a clear conflict of interest amongst the slue of illegal ac-
tivity.125 Alexander, the company's founder and chief executive,
received 100,000 options with the extra backdated earning poten-
tial of $10.7 million, and $130 million company-wide. 26 These
numbers are staggering, and it is no wonder Alexander at-
tempted to conceal his activity when the company went under in-
vestigation.1 27
122 See supra notes 53-57 (describing the lucrative payout of McGuire's grants).
123 See supra note 57 (explaining the unlikelihood of the stock option grants falling, by
mere chance, on the specified dates); see also Iwata, supra note 1, at 1B ("UnitedHealth's
senior officers, directors and legal and accounting experts 'never raised concerns at the
time' about the options, Brodsky says. He says the board compensation committee was
advised by attorneys and human-resource professionals, yet routinely backdated grants.").
124 See supra note 63 (describing Alexander's illegal activities); see also Jonathan Peter-
son, Ex-Comverse CEO Arrested in Namibia; The Fugitive Faces Extradition to the U.S. to
Answer Charges of Stock Option Fraud at the Tech Company, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2006,
at C3 ("Stock options give their holders the right to buy stock at a set price within a cer-
tain time limit. Typically, that price is the same as the price on the day the option was
granted. But at Comverse and other companies, insiders may have improperly cherry-
picked dates from the past that had lower stock prices.").
125 See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing the stock option backdating of-
fenses of Comverse Technology); see also Slush Fund and Fake Employees, supra note 3,
at Al (stating that the SEC reported that options were distributed "company-wide").
126 See Slush Fund and Fake Employees, supra note 3, at Al (reporting the egregious
amount of personal profits for Comverse's founder who received nearly a quarter of the
total options granted inside the company); see also Peterson, supra note 124, at C3 (de-
scribing Comverse CEO Kobi Alexander's flight from the country, subsequent arrest, and
the stock fraud charges he faced in 2006).
127 See Slush Fund and Fake Employees, supra note 3, at Al. Alexander was the master
manipulator of the scheme. He, in effect, tricked the compensation committee by instruct-
ing his secretary to create dozens of phony names to mix in with "real people on the list of
options presented to directors for approval." He would then dole out the options as he
pleased, including one grant to an Israeli executive who was not pleased with his pay, and
even directed that the options vesting date for this gift be changed so that the executive
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Apple Computers executive Steve Jobs tried to mislead the
public by allowing the initial internal investigation to be released
clearing him of any wrongdoing, without disclosing the fact that
he received $7.5 million in backdated options in 2002.128 This is a
clear conflict of interest for the well-touted executive, one that
was cleverly left undisclosed to the public until the investigation
commenced.129
Even when there is no conflict of interest for the directors,
there is still a breach of the duty of loyalty because many of the
executives' decisions were made in bad faith. The directors failed
to work for the benefit of the corporation when they allowed any-
one to receive undisclosed backdated stock options, as it sub-
jected the company to liability for both securities and tax fraud,
even if they themselves did not benefit from the options. 130 Ex-
ecutives, even when holding the health of the company above
their own personal practices, whether or not it was done for good
reason, 131 are not permitted to blatantly break established rules.
Surely no executive could have thought that any type of decep-
tion to the company about grant dates would coincide with his
strict duty of loyalty owed to the company.
The Delaware court has even articulated, in Ryan v. Gifford,
that "[b]ackdating options qualifies as one of those 'rare cases [in
which] a transaction may be so egregious on its face that board
approval cannot meet the test of business judgment, and a sub-
stantial likelihood of director liability therefore exists."' 132 And
while the court presumably limited its holding to the "unique
could cash them out immediately. See also Peterson, supra note 124, at C3. Mark J. Mer-
shon, then-assistant director in charge of the FBI's New York field office, noted that
"Alexander's alleged role in options backdating victimized Comverse shareholders and
deceived prospective investors."
128 See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text (noting the internal investigation into
Apple's chief executive, Steve Jobs, and the company's failure to report significant data).
129 See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
130 See supra notes 79-88 and corresponding text (detailing another options backdating
scandal regarding executives at Brocade Communications, a telecommunications company
based on California).
131 See Brocade Execs Indicted Over Backdating of Stock Options, 12 No. 20 ANDREWS
DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP. 5 (2006) (describing the backdating of hiring letters and grants
to retain talent in the competitive high-tech industry); see also Reynolds, supra note 65, at
4 (citing CEO Alexander's defense of backdating when stating "everyone in the Silicon
Valley was doing it").
132 Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 355-56 (Del. Ch. 2007) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
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facts" of the case, this holding likely has staggering implica-
tions. 133
The facts of Ryan coincide with those of other current backdat-
ing scandals.13 4 Maxim Integrated Products had a stock option
plan that was blatantly broken by its founder, chairman, and
CEO, Gifford.1 35 The court found that the directors' "[deliberate
attempt] to circumvent their duty to price the shares at no less
than market value on the option grant dates" by backdating the
grants, combined with the fact that the directors failed to disclose
the conduct by "making false representations" of grant dates was
enough to overcome the business judgment rule.1 36 The plaintiffs
did not need to provide facts that proved grants were backdated;
studies suggesting that the grant dates were not the result of
pure chance were enough for the court to infer manipulation.1 37
The Chancery also commented that he was "unable to fathom a
situation where the deliberate violation of a shareholder ap-
proved stock option plan and false disclosures, obviously in-
tended to mislead shareholders into thinking that the directors
complied honestly with the shareholder-approved option plan, is
anything but an act of bad faith."138
133 See Ryan, 918 A.2d at 350 (asserting that the case "address[es] novel issues," but is
also one that "encompasses numerous issues"); see also Duane Morris, U.S.: Delaware
Court Issues Two Rulings in Options Backdating and Spring-loading Cases (Mar. 14,
2007), http://www.duanemorris.com/alerts/alert2451.html (claiming that this "decision
addresses many issues likely to recur in other stock options backdating cases, though the
[c]ourt limited its holding to the 'unique facts' of the case.").
134 See, e.g., supra notes 49-76 (describing the current backdating scandals).
135 See Ryan, 918 A.2d at 346, 347, 357-58 (explaining Gifford's relation with Maxim
and basic terms of Maxim's stock option plan, concluding the plan was intentionally vio-
lated); see also Morris, supra note 133 (noting that "it was the combined actions of the di-
rectors [in Ryan v. Gifford] that entailed an effort to deceive Maxim's shareholders in or-
der to lead the shareholders to believe that the stock options were granted in accordance
with the terms of the stock options plans.").
136 See Ryan, 918 A.2d at 358.
137 See id. at 354. Plaintiff pointed to "highly suspicious timing" and other "empirical
evidence suggesting that backdating occurred." Id. The empirical evidence was a Merrill
Lynch analysis which "measured the extent to which stock price performance subsequent
to options pricing events diverged from stock price performance over a longer period of
time." Id. The Merrill Lynch analysis revealed that "Maxim's average annualized return
of 243% on option grants to management was almost ten times higher than the 29% an-
nualized market returns in the same period." Id.
138 Id. at 358.
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Companies are required to have a stock option plan on file with
the SEC.139 As a result, any of the executives that violated their
company's stock option plans by backdating while failing to dis-
close this additional compensation are likely to be found to have
acted in bad faith. This triggers personal liability of the execu-
tives because they will be precluded from seeking indemnifica-
tion or collecting on insurance policies. 140
This view is further reflected in the case of the executives at
Brocade Communications, where former CEO, Gregory Reyes,
and former VP of Human Resources, Stephanie Jensen, neither
of whom had personally benefited from the stock option grants,
were nonetheless federally indicted.141 Because they did not
stand to personally profit from the options, there was no conflict
of interest. However, the executives acted with a reckless disre-
gard for the law. The executives changed the dates of board
meeting minutes in order to backdate options to days when meet-
ings never took place, and backdated employment offer letters as
incentives to new employees. 142 This activity was in clear viola-
tion of accounting rules, and the government maintains in their
indictment that the pair's "alleged efforts to conceal the backdat-
ing demonstrate they were aware they were breaking the law
and the accounting rules."'143 This activity clearly worked to the
detriment of the corporation, as the company has been forced to
restate five years of financial reports. 144 In light of Ryan v. Gif-
ford, the court will likely find that these executives acted in bad
faith, even if they did not explicitly break an existing stock option
plan. They not only acted in ways that did not advance the best
interest of the corporation, but also violated the law. They inten-
tionally failed to report the backdated options, which is tanta-
mount to "failing to act in the face of a known duty to act."'145
139 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.9b-1 (2007) (providing that companies shall file options disclo-
sure documents that detail their option's plans with the SEC); see also Perfect Payday,
supra note 3, at Al (observing that "companies grant their options under a shareholder
approved 'option plan' on file with the SEC").
140 See supra notes 111-113 (outlining personal liability).
141 See supra notes 80 & 82 and corresponding text.
142 See supra notes 84-85 and corresponding text.
143 See Mintz, supra note 81, at 1C.
144 See supra note 88 and corresponding text.




Many executives initially tried to escape the duty of loyalty
analysis completely by claiming that they had no knowledge of
the alleged backdating, or that it just did not exist. 146 According
to Graham v. Allis, "directors will not be liable for the illegal
conduct of a corporation's employees if they do not have actual
knowledge of the conduct or a cause for suspicion that improper
conduct is occurring unless there is 'a sustained or systematic
failure of the board to exercise oversight."'' 147 UnitedHealth at-
tempted to release a report to clear executives of wrongdoing,
blaming "inadequate" internal controls and the executives' enti-
tlement to presume that "matters brought before them for action
were procedurally proper and consistent with applicable legal
and accounting standards."'148 The company clearly has not stood
by this position, as it has forced William McGuire, its former
Chief Executive, to resign. 149 Comverse Technology executive
Kobi Alexander initially tried to claim he had no knowledge of
the backdating, and blamed a former CEO for the problems. 150
Faced with evidence of his involvement, he tried to justify his ac-
tions by claiming "everyone was doing it. '' 151 Since the court in
Stone v. Ritter recognized that the test for liability should be
"quite high" and liability for employee failures is "possibly the
most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff
146 See, e.g., Dash & Freudenheim, supra note 51, at Al (blaming "inadequate' internal
controls"); see Slush Fund and Fake Employees, supra note 3, at Al (denying backdating).
147 See Golden, supra note 105 (stating holding of Graham); see also Graham v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 131 (1963) (affirming ruling that individual director
defendants are not liable merely because some employees violated anti-trust laws, sub-
jecting corporation to loss).
148 Dash & Freudenheim, supra note 51, at Al (quoting the affidavit).
149 See id. ("Dr. William W. McGuire, a medical entrepreneur who built the United-
Health Group into a colossus in its field, was forced to resign from the company yesterday
and to give up a portion of the $1.1 billion he holds in harshly criticized stock options.");
see also Editorial, Channeling Sgt. Schultz, ST. LOUIs POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 19, 2006, at
D10 ("Four corporate CEOs have lost their jobs in recent weeks over such arrangements.
The latest is Dr. William McGuire of UnitedHealth Group, one of the nation's largest
health insurance companies. UnitedHealthcare, as it's known here, controls 13.5 percent
of the group health market in Missouri and almost 16 percent of HMO coverage.").
150 See Slush Fund and Fake Employees, supra note 3, at Al (describing his attempted
denial); see also Robert E. Kessler, 3 Comuerse Ex-execs Indicted; Trio Charged With Ma-
nipulating Stock Options and Raking in Millions at Company with Woodbury Offices,
NEWSDAY, Aug. 10, 2006, at A44 (reporting indictments of three former top executives of
Comverse Technology, Inc. including Kobi Alexander).
151 See Reynolds, supra note 65, at 4 (stating explanation Alexander used for backdating
scandal); see also Slush Fund and Fake Employees, supra note 3, at Al (quoting Alexan-
der in an affidavit).
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might hope to win a judgment," it is no wonder the executives
were so eager to deny wrongdoing. 152
B. 10B5 Violations
Not only can undisclosed in-the-money options violate state
law, but also federal securities laws, namely Rule 10B5 of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934. Rule 10B5 prohibits material
misrepresentations or omissions in connection with the purchase
and sale of securities. 153
The improperly backdated grants can accurately be character-
ized as either a misrepresentation or an omission. When net
earnings were under-reported in SEC financial statements and
taxes, and true income exceeded the reported amount, there has
been an affirmative misrepresentation of executive income. On
the other hand, large amounts of actual executive compensation
were omitted from the net earnings numbers.
In order to establish a 10B5 violation, certain requirements
must be met. There must be: (1) misrepresentations in connec-
tion with the purchase and sale of a security; 54 (2) a breach of a
fiduciary duty; 155 (3) a manipulative or deceptive device em-
ployed; 156 (4) a material misrepresentation; 157 (5) scienter;158 (6)
reliance; 159 and (7) causation. 160
152 Golden, supra note 105 (citing Stone v. Ritter decision).
153 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (2007) ("It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indi-
rectly, by the use of any means of or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or any facility of any national securities exchange, a) To employ any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud, b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or c) To engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."). See generally Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (stating the requirements of the Se-
curities Exchange Act).
154 See 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (2007); see also Wharf (Holdings) Ltd v. United Int'l Hold-
ings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588, 593 (2001) (indicating plaintiff must show defendant used one of
four kinds of deception).
155 See Dirks v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983) (requiring manipulation
or deception for a breach of duty under Rule 10b-5); see also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977) (mentioning the fiduciary duty breach requirement).
156 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (analyzing materiality require-
ment); see also Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 472-73 (describing Congress' objective to prevent
manipulative or deceptive devices).
157 See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (setting the stan-
dard for materiality).
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First, the misrepresentations must be in connection with the
purchase and sale of a security. 161 This is a factual inquiry.162
The Supreme Court held that the "in connection with" element is
satisfied when the deception "touches" the purchase and sale of
securities. 163 For purposes of 10B5, stock options are considered
securities, 64 so when executives manipulated the grant dates on
the stock options and caused misleading financial statements to
which the public relied in purchasing stock, their actions were in
direct connection to the purchase and sale of a security. 65
There must also be a breach of fiduciary duty, which as de-
scribed in the previous section, can likely be established in most
stock options cases. 66 In addition, a manipulative or deceptive
158 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 231-32 (affirming the materiality standard); see also Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (outlining plaintiff's burden to show knowl-
edge of fraud).
159 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 243 (agreeing that "reliance is an element of a Rule 10b-5
cause of action"); see also Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. C. Jones & Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1375,
1379 (D. Colo. 2004) (stating that reliance is required for private actions under Rule 10b-
5).
160 See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005) (stating that at Rule 10b-
5 claim must state a casual connection between the material representation and the loss);
see also Basic, 485 U.S. at 243 (noting the requirement for a "causal connection").
161 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §10 (codified at 15 U.S.C.S. §78(j) (2007)); see
also Pommer v. Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 1992) (reiterating the require-
ments of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10).
162 See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292, 1302 (11th. Cir. 2004) (ex-
plaining that the jury's unique competence in ascertaining what a "reasonable" share-
holder would have considered material under the circumstances usually precludes sum-
mary judgment in Rule 10B5 actions); see also Pommer, 961 F.2d at 623 (allowing the jury
to decide whether there was a connection on a factual basis).
163 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971) (describ-
ing the balance between the government's desire to preserve state actions for fiduciary
breaches and Congress' intent to "bar deceptive devices and contrivances in the purchase
or sale of securities whether conducted in the organized markets or face to face").
164 See Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502, 507-08 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding
that a stock option trader has standing to sue as a purchaser of a security under Rule
1OB5); see also Liebhard v. Square D Co., No. 91-C-1103, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15582, at
* 12 (E.D. Ill. 1992) (positing that because options traders affect the options market, they
have standing to sue for alleged misrepresentations under Rule 10b-5).
165 See, e.g., supra notes 55-57 & 61-66 (describing the backdating exploits of several
executives); see Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. C. Jones & Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1380 (D.
Colo. 2004) (explaining that defendant provided and directed others to provide false in-
formation to a broker-dealer to hide his affiliations with a company).
166 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977) (stating that a claim of
fraud and fiduciary breach states a cause of action when combined with "manipulative or
deception"). See generally supra notes 99-153 (discussing the fiduciary duty owed to
stockholders); see also Dirks v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983) (stating
that plaintiff must also allege manipulation or deception under 10b-5).
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device must have been employed. 167 This is required in order to
ensure that this federal cause of action is based on more than
just a state-regulated breach of fiduciary duty.168 A device is ma-
nipulative when there was some type of "omission or misstate-
ment" by the company. 169 When companies involved in the stock
options scandal released accounting statements that omitted
stock options, misrepresenting net profits and earnings, this was
a violation of the federal standard, as these statements dictated
the value of the corporation's stock.170 Since this sometimes re-
sulted in mass understatements of earnings for multiple years, 171
it is reasonable to infer that liability can be attached.172
The misrepresentations must also be material. 173 This stan-
dard was originally set forth in TSC Industries v. Northway,
where the Supreme Court determined that misrepresentation or
omission is material if there is a "substantial likelihood" that a
reasonable investor might consider the information important in
167 See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 472-73 (describing that a Rule 10b-5 claim is allowed only
if it coincides with the intent of Congress, which was to prevent manipulation or decep-
tion, not just breaches of fiduciary duty); see also Advanced Laser Prod., Inc. v. Signature
Stock Transfer, Inc., No. 98-CV-1624-D, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5179, at *5 (N.D. Tex.
1999) (noting that deception is required to state a cause of action under Rule 10b or 10b-
5).
168 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §10 (codified at 15 U.S.C.S. §78(j) (2007)) (em-
phasizing that the purpose of the federal legislation is to ensure the protection of inves-
tors through fair transactions and full disclosure, and also to facilitate commerce by en-
suring that issuers of stock are able to raise capital); see also Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476-
77 (elaborating on part of the purpose of the 1934 Act to prevent the misleading of inves-
tors and promote a philosophy of full disclosure); see also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bank-
ers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (stating the purpose of the Act is not "limited to
preserving the integrity of the securities markets").
169 Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 474 (noting the lack of omission or misstatement in notice ac-
companying the merger document was not sufficient to state a cause of action under 10-
b5); see Reeder v. Mastercraft Elec. Corp, 363 F. Supp. 574, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (stating
that the plaintiff investors were entitled to full disclosure of all material business pros-
pects).
170 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
M See, e.g., Dash & Freudenheim, supra note 51, at Al (detailing the restatement of
Comverse Technology summarizing the scandal); see also Williams, supra note 87 (stating
the restatements of Brocade Communications).
172 See Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 882 (5th Cir. 1970) (discussing case where cor-
porate officers deceived shareholders by making affirmative misrepresentations in corpo-
ration's annual report and by failing to file same report following year). See generally
Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 825 (5th Cir. 1970) (summarizing allegations that corpo-
rate officers used reports to deceive shareholders and concealed improper payments to the
corporation's president).
173 See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (setting standard
for materiality under Rule 14a-9).
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determining whether to buy or sell the security. 174 This prong
would be tougher to prove when the number of stock options is
insignificant compared to the total value and profits of the com-
pany. 175 If the percentage of the securities given to the executive
was significant, the amount of executive compensation could still
be considered material to investors. The large stock option
granted to Steve Jobs that totaled almost two percent of the all
outstanding shares of Apple is likely material because it is such a
large misstatement of earnings. 176
Scienter, or knowledge of the misrepresentation is also re-
quired. 177 Scienter is defined as an "intent to deceive, manipu-
late, or defraud."'178 The intent of many executives in these cases
is clear: to manipulate the dates of stock options in order to re-
ceive them after they had already increased in value. The benefit
is reporting them as if they were at-the-money so as to avoid add-
ing them as compensation in accounting reports, and/or paying
taxes on their true value. 79 This is exemplified in the case of
Comverse Technology where there was direct evidence of execu-
tives changing grant dates and subsequently deceiving the com-
pensation committee. 80
While an executive might prove that he had no knowledge of
the backdating, his naivet6 is not necessarily dispositive.' 8 1 Many
174 Id.; see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (affirming the rule 14a-9 ma-
teriality standard articulated by the Court in TSC Indus. 's).
175 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 767-68 n.533 (Del. Ch.
2005) (comparing the ramifications of $ 734 million sale of subsidiary and hiring of em-
ployee to 1996 revenues of almost $ 19 billion).
176 See supra notes 89-92 (referring to the misdeeds of the well-touted executive); see
also Bebchuk, supra note 89, at A6 (describing the backdated grant of Steve Jobs of 7.5
million Apple shares, totaling roughly 2% of all outstanding shares); Joe Nocera, Nice
Phone, Mr. Jobs, But, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2007, at C1 (reporting that Apple grant to Jobs
finalized in December 2001 but carried an October 2001 date).
177 See Aaron v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 446 U.S. 680, 692 (1999) (expanding the re-
quirement of scienter regardless of plaintiffs identity or type of relief sought); see also
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (concluding that scienter is re-
quired for a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d
1190, 1197 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating that scienter is a requisite element of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934).
178 Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 (defining scienter).
179 See generally supra notes 19-34 (describing the scandal and executive activities).
180 See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (outlining the wrongdoings at Com-
verse).
181 See, e.g., Dash & Freudenheim, supra note 51, at Ai (explaining UnitedHealth's
claim that its executives were entitled to presume that "matters brought before them for
action were procedurally proper and consistent with applicable legal and accounting stan-
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circuit courts have found that recklessness satisfies the require-
ment of scienter.18 2 Recklessness is conduct that can be defined
as a "highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple,
or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from
the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of
misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defen-
dant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of
it."183 Although the actual state of mind of the defendants will
depend on a factual inquiry,18 4 it is reasonable to assume that
much of the large-scale backdating, even if direct executive
knowledge cannot be proven, still warrants a finding of extreme
recklessness and ignorance in failing to curtail the fraud, espe-
cially when some of the backdating practices exceeded a dec-
ade.18 5
For a 10B5 violation, reliance must also be established.18 6 The
purchasers of the securities must have relied on the misleading
information when the securities were purchased.18 7 If the infor-
mation is non-public, then actual reliance must be shown.188
dards"); see Slush Fund and Fake Employees, supra note 3, at Al (describing Comverse
Executive Kobi Alexander's initial denial of having knowledge of the backdating).
182 See, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568-69 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990)
(listing multiple circuits that have held recklessness satisfies scienter requirement).
183 Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1569 (defining recklessness); Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228
F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Hollinger definition of recklessness).
184 See Karen Schoen, Comment, Insider Trading: The "Possession Versus Use" Debate,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 239, 257 (1999) (highlighting that factual inquiries are required to ob-
tain an understanding of "the state of mind and motivations of the trader."); see also Ed-
ward J. Yodowitz, Does Recklessness Satisfy the Scienter Requirement?, THE CPA
JOURNAL ONLINE, Dec. 1989, available at http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournallold
/08033856.htm (stating that whether a third party's reliance "is reasonably foreseeable in
a specific case will likely depend on the particular facts involved").
i5 See, e..g., Nightly Business Report (Cmty. Television Found. Of S. Florida television
broadcast Aug. 9, 2006) (illustrating FBI claims of backdating at Comverse Technology
that spanned over 10 years); see Slush Fund and Fake Employees, supra note 3, at Al (re-
vealing 26 improperly dated grants at Comverse between 1991 and 2001);
186 See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988) (agreeing that reliance is an
"element of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action"); see also Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. C. Jones & Co.,
312 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1379 (D. Colo. 2004) (stating that reliance is required for private
actions under 10b-5).
187 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-47 (describing the reliance standard); see also, In re
Gupta Corp. Sec. Litig., C 94-1517 FMS, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22093, at *11 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 18, 1995) (stating that "[u]nder the fraud on the market theory, the plaintiff has the
benefit of a presumption that he has indirectly relied on the alleged misstatement, by re-
lying on the integrity of the stock price established by the market.").
188 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246 (commenting that since "most publicly available informa-
tion is reflected in market price, an investor's reliance on any public material misrepre-
sentations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action."); see also
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However, since statements are required to be filed with the SEC
under accounting rules, and consequently made public, proving
actual reliance will not be necessary. 189
Alternatively, for backdating, reliance can be established
through the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, which provides for
presumed reliance if the misleading information was publicly
disseminated. 190 This is a rebuttable presumption that is based
on the economic theory that when a materially false statement or
omission is made by a company, investors rely on the "integrity of
the price set by the market."1 91 Moreover, even though ordinary
investors do not read complicated financial statements, the mar-
ket is set by sophisticated stock analysts, who do read these
statements and, therefore, ordinary investors indirectly rely on
them.192
A defendant can rebut the presumption of reliance, which is
based on the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, by "1) disproving ma-
teriality or by proving that, despite materiality, an insufficient
number of traders relied to inflate the price; and 2) by proving
West v. Prudential Sec.,Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that when misin-
formation is not available to the public, it cannot be the basis for a claim under the fraud
on the market doctrine).
189 See Lie, supra note 24. This is testimony on accounting rule APB opinion No. 25,
which was phased out in 2005. It discusses the new accounting rule FAS 123R and the
changes it has enacted. See also Lie, supra note 4. This provides additional discussion of
the new accounting rule and its changes.
190 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 242. "The Court of Appeals held that in order to invoke the
presumption, a plaintiff must allege and prove: 1) that the defendant made public misrep-
resentations; 2) that the misrepresentations were material; 3) that the shares were traded
on an efficient market; 4) that the misrepresentations would induce a reasonable, relying
investor to misjudge the value of the shares; and 5) that the plaintiff traded the shares
between the time the misrepresentations were made and the time the truth was re-
vealed." Id. at 248. This paper highlights that "[iun Basic, the Court concluded that 'mis-
leading information will ... defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not di-
rectly rely on the misstatements."' Defending Securities Class Actions, ALI-ABA COURSE
OF STUDY MATERIALS (2003).
191 Basic, 485, U.S. at 245 ("Requiring a plaintiff to show a speculative state of facts,
i.e., how he would have acted if omitted material information had been disclosed, or if the
misrepresentation had not been made, would place an unnecessarily unrealistic eviden-
tiary burden on the Rule 10b-5 plaintiff who has traded on an impersonal market."); see
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908 (9th Cir. 1975) (citing that a "speculative negative,"
that is, one that requires a "plaintiff prove directly that he would have acted differently
had he known the true facts," is unnecessary and is thereby rejected by the court).
192 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 242 (citing the district court that found "the presumption of
reliance created by the fraud-on-the-market theory provided 'a practical resolution to the
problem of balancing the substantive requirement of proof of reliance in securities cases
against the procedural requisites of FRCP 23"); see also West, 282 F.3d at 937 (describing
Basic and the fraud-on-the-market doctrine).
2008]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY
that an individual plaintiff purchased despite knowledge of the
falsity of a representation, or that he would have, had he known
of it.''193
Because all traders theoretically relied on the financial state-
ments released to the SEC, the executives would have to disprove
that their compensation was material to stock prices in order to
invoke the first prong. This is unlikely as most investors would
likely consider how much executives were raking in from the
company for their own personal profit to be material to the
health of the company, and consequently, to stock prices.
In addition, since the stock options were fraudulently hidden
from released financial statements to the SEC, stock investors in
the companies that participated in backdating would have had no
way of knowing about the additional compensation, and the com-
panies would therefore have difficulty rebutting the presumption
of reliance based on the second prong. Thus, the fraud-on-the-
market theory would create a presumption of reliance.
The final requirement of causation calls for a "causal connec-
tion between the defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiffs
injury."194 In cases where there is an affirmative misrepresenta-
tion, there are multiple ways to establish the causal connection.
First, reliance on the market may be used to prove causation. 195
One may also establish the "causal nexus" indirectly by "proof of
materiality coupled with the common sense that a stock pur-
chaser does not ordinarily seek to purchase a loss in the form of
artificially inflated stock."196 Under this standard, the plaintiffs
in stock option backdating cases should not have a problem prov-
ing a causal connection between the fraudulent activities of ex-
ecutives and the consequential harm to the corporation or to
their individual stock portfolios. The injuries to the corporation,
193 Blackie, 524 F.2d at 906 (outlining how defendants can rebut the fraud-on-the-
market doctrine).
194 Basic, 485 U.S. at 243.
195 See id. at 243 (highlighting that although reliance can be used to show "the requisite
causal connection between a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiffs injury," there
is "more than one way to demonstrate the causal connection."); see also Donald Eric Re-
mensperger, The Second Circuit Review- 1981-1982 Term: Security: Causation in Fraud-
on-the.Market Actions--Investors' Insurance in the Second Circuit?, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV.
1291, 1323 (1983) (stating that "an action under 10b-5 requires a showing of reliance to
establish this causation.").
196 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 245 (quoting Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908 (9th Cir.
1975).
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including negative publicity, large market reductions, and the
cost of accounting restatements and tax re-filings, 197 were all the
direct result of the grant manipulations. Causation is a logical
finding.
However, this is not the standard for causation in all circuits.
In the recent case of Oscar v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., the Court
adopted its own fraud-on-the-market rule that required "loss
causation," which provides that "the plaintiff [may] recover under
the fraud on the market theory if he [can] prove that the defen-
dant's non-disclosure materially affected the market price of the
security."'98 This new standard is set forth in Basic v. Levinson,
which provides for the rebuttal of reliance when the causal con-
nection between the misrepresentation and the plaintiffs injury
are severed. 199 In cases such as Apple Computers, where share-
holders actually bid up the stock by more than $5 per share at
one point,20 0 proving actual loss causation could be extremely dif-
ficult. However, even this rise might have been fraudulently in-
duced, as it followed a company disclosure stating that its well-
touted CEO, Steve Jobs, had received no benefit from or did not
appreciate the accounting implications of any stock option
grants.201 According to later reports, Jobs received a fortuitous
grant of 7.5 million Apple shares that were allegedly backdated
by 2 months. 20 2 In addition, considering reports put the losses in
market capitalization of companies the day after reported back-
dating announcements at around $5.1 billion,20 3 most sharehold-
197 See, e.g., Comverse Exec Sentenced in Options Case, BOSTON GLOBE, May 10, 2007,
available at http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2007/05/l0/comverse
exec-sentence (indicating that the cost to Comverse technology for backdating malfea-
sance was judicially calculated at $51.8 million); see Dash & Freudenheim, supra note 51,
at Al (describing UnitedHealth's accounting restatement).
198 487 F. 3d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F. 3d
400, 414 (5th Cir. 2001)) (requiring loss causation).
199 See id. (stating requirements were not "plucked from the air," but rather came from
Basic).
200 See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text (describing the market reaction to
Apple news).
201 See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying test (detailing results of Apple backdat-
ing).
202 See Bebchuk, supra note 89, at A6 (detailing the massive grant to Steve Jobs). See
generally Karen Gullo & Connie Guglielmo, Apple's Jobs Questioned in Options Probe,
Lawyers Say (Update 3), BLOOMBERG, Jan. 23, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.comapps
/news?pid=20670001&refer=conews&sid.htm (detailing the involvement of Jobs in the
governmental probe into backdated stock options granted).
203 See Taub, supra note 48 (reporting the findings of Glass Lewis).
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ers should not have a problem establishing causation, even with
this potentially higher standard in some circuits.
Therefore, when company executives made inaccurate disclo-
sures by omitting large portions of their compensation from the
company's earnings as a result of fraudulent stock options to the
SEC and, consequently, to the public, they can be found guilty of
directly violating Section 10B5 of the Securities Exchange Act. 20 4
C. Shareholder Litigation
i. Types of Suits
When a company has committed fraud by illegally backdating
option grants and failing to properly disclose and report them,
two types of actions can be brought by injured shareholders: a
class action lawsuit or a derivative suit.20 5 A class action civil suit
is brought by "one or more people on behalf of themselves and
others" who have been similarly and directly injured.20 6 A deriva-
tive suit is a civil action brought by a shareholder on behalf of the
corporation to enforce corporate rights against directors or other
insiders .207
In the case of the stock option grant backdating, the type of ac-
tion filed will likely depend on whether or not the plaintiffs stock
took a dive and caused a direct harm on the shareholder when
news of the backdating was disseminated, or when the costs of
litigation, as well as accounting and tax restatements had a di-
rect effect on the stock value. In these cases, a class action is a
more appropriate remedy. For example, the shareholders of
204 See, e.g., supra notes 25-26.
205 See Mateja & Willis, supra note 5 ("Misstatements and accounting irregularities can
lead to class actions and shareholder derivative lawsuits that claim damages arising from
the misstatements on behalf of shareholders and the corporations themselves"); see also
Francine McKenna, Stock Options Backdating: An Update for Auditors, The IIA Chicago
Conference, Apr. 2, 2007, available at http://www.mckennapartners.comdownloads
/MPIIA-Chgo_0407.pdf (discussing the two types of suits available, a class action suit,
where "the shareholder plaintiff is the allegedly injured party," and a derivative suit,
where "the corporation, not the shareholder plaintiff, is the allegedly injured party.").
206 What is a Class Action Lawsuit, FREEADVICE, http://law.freeadvice.com/financial-
_law/brokerdisputes/classaction.htm.
207 See MBCA §7.41(2). The named plaintiff in a derivative suit must be a fair and ade-
quate representative for the corporation's interests. A derivative suit is also called a de-
rivative action, and has been defined as "[a] suit by a beneficiary of a fiduciary to enforce
a right belonging to the fiduciary." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 203 (3d ed. 2003).
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Comverse Technology filed a class action lawsuit against the ex-
ecutives, including the company's CEO, Kobi Alexander, alleging
that "improperly backdated stock options produced a windfall for
top officers of Comverse," "at the expense of the software com-
pany's shareholders." 208 The suit claims that "during the class
period, the defendants knowingly made material misstatements
and omissions regarding the actual dates of stock-option grants,"
and that, consequently, the Comverse stock dropped more than
$6 per share. 20 9 Class actions have also been filed against a slue
of other companies with similar allegations. 210
If the shareholder cannot prove any direct effect on the stock's
value, then a derivative suit is a more appropriate remedy.
Companies under suspicion of backdating have been subjected to
charges amounting to over $5 billion dollars. 211 Therefore, proof
of damage to the company is practically a non-issue. Sharehold-
ers have already filed derivative suits against multiple compa-
nies alleging, among other things, breaches of fiduciary duty and
fraud arising from the improper backdating and reporting of
stock options.2 12
ii. Causes of Action
There are two causes of action a shareholder is likely to bring
against a company or executives in the wake of stock option
backdating: (1) a state cause of action for the breach of the fidu-
208 See Law Firms Fight for Lead Role in Comverse Backdating Suits, supra note 61, at
12 (mentioning the fight between law firms for the lead role in the Comverse lawsuits).
209 Id.
210 See Zucker v. Zoran Corp., No. C 06-04843 (WHA), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93469, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2006) (seeking to recover for inflatedly priced Zoran stock that did
not truly reflect the company's compensation costs as a result of the alleged backdating);
see also Hacker v. Peterschmidt, Nos. C 06-03468, C 06-04479, C 06-04509, C 06-04524
(SI), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77325, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2006) (outlining a class ac-
tion complaint against Openwave for issuing false and misleading financial statements
caused from backdating of stock options).
211 See Dash, supra note 33, at C1 (citing to Glass Lewis Company); see also Taub, supra
note 48 (citing the San Francisco Chronicle's figure of $5.2 billion charged to companies to
correct backdating).
212 See, e.g., American Tower Corp. Execs Face Suit Over Options Backdating, supra
note 118, at 10 (alleging that option grant manipulation caused breaches in duties of loy-
alty, and subjected the company to costly SEC investigations); see Judge Consolidates
Suits Charging Rambus Execs Backdated Options, 22 No. 5 ANDREWS CORP. OFF. &
DIRECTORS LIAB. LITIG. REP. 13 (2006) (alleging that Rambus, Inc. failed to properly re-
cord in the money options as compensation on financial statements, "thereby inflating its
net income").
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ciary duty of loyalty; or (2) a federal cause of action under 10B5
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
A plaintiff suing for the breach of the duty of loyalty will face
different burdens of proof depending on whether the conflicted
transaction was ratified or not.213 If all aspects of the conflicted
transaction were disclosed to the disinterested directors or
shareholders, the transaction will be considered to be an "arm's-
length" transaction and directors' decision will thereby likely be
protected by the business judgment rule.214 In this case, a suing
plaintiff must overcome the difficult burden of proving that the
transaction lacks entire fairness to the corporation. 215 This, how-
ever, is likely not the case, as the essence of the backdating scan-
dal stems from the fact that the options were left undisclosed to
shareholders.
Since shareholders can show that adequate disclosures of stock
options were not made, namely left unreported to the SEC, the
burden is then on the parties to the transaction, namely the di-
rectors, to prove entire fairness. 21 6 This will be difficult consider-
ing it is unlikely executives can prove it was entirely fair to the
corporation for it to receive millions less in revenue because an
executive fraudulently changed the grant dates on his stock op-
tions.21 7 In addition, companies abound that have loss serious
market capitalization, such as Brocade Communications who
213 See Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1980) (deciding the burden of
proof issue); see also Black, supra note 99 (describing the different burdens of proof).
214 See Black, supra note 99 (referring to arms-length transactions); see also Feld
Thoughts, Board of Directors: Duty of Care and Duty of Loyalty (July 11, 2006), available
at http://www.feld.comlblog/archives/O01822.html (describing the business judgment rule
as a court's reluctance to "rethink a board's action or decision if it's reasonably clear that
the board made rational decisions and acted within the notions of their fiduciary duties").
215 See Lewis, 629 F.2d at 768-69 (stating that the "business judgment rule places a
heavy burden on shareholders who would attack corporate transactions"); see also Black,
supra note 99 (describing the burden of proof as entire fairness).
216 See Lewis, 629 F.2d at 769 (citing §713 that proves that "a contract 'shall establish
affirmatively that the contract or transaction was fair and reasonable as to the corpora-
tion at the time it was approved by the board. . .' Thus when the transaction is challenged
in a derivative action against the interested directors, they have the burden of proving
that the transaction was fair and reasonable to the corporation."); see also Sage v. Culver,
147 N.Y. 241, 247 (Ct. App. 1895) (stating that a "trustee is bound to explain the transac-
tion, and show that the same was fair, and that no undue advantage had been taken by
him of his position...").
217 See, e.g., Slush Fund and Fake Employees, supra note 3 at Al (stating that execu-
tives received millions in backdated options); see Dean, supra note 95 (citing the $51 mil-




have seen their stock drop by more than 70% between 2002 and
2007.218
For a 10B5 violation, a private plaintiff has an implied right of
action under the '34 Act, 219 and must prove all of the elements,
including a misrepresentations in connection with the purchase
and sale of a security, 220 a breach of a fiduciary duty,221 a ma-
nipulative or deceptive device employed, 222 a material misrepre-
sentation,223 scienter,224 reliance, 225 and causation. 226
VI. THE FUTURE OF BACKDATING
In the midst of the backdating scandal, as of 2002, the SEC has
attempted to curb the future potential for backdating in the
United States by enacting new rules to govern the disclosure of
stock options. In July 2002, Sarbanes Oxley was enacted, which
requires stricter disclosure of accounting and financial activities,
including the requirement that stock options be reported to the
218 Glenn Curtis, The Dangers of Options Backdating, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, Feb. 26,
2007, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/optioninvestor/07/options backdating.asp.
219 See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971) (stating
that a private right of action is recognized); see also Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 824
(5th Cir. 1970) (finding that that "individual right of action [is] implied under Rule 10b-
5.").
220 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §10 (codified at 15 U.S.C.S. §78(j) (2007)) (an-
nouncing the unlawfulness of manipulative and deceptive devices in interstate commerce
and in any national securities exchange); see generally Pommer v. Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d
620 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act).
221 See Dirks v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 646, 656 (1983) (holding that if a special
relationship exists, the person who receives non-public information has a fiduciary duty to
disclose it before trading); see also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977)
(mentioning the fiduciary duty breach requirement).
222 See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 473-74 (describing Congress' objective to prevent manipu-
lative or deceptive devices).
223 See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (stating that the
standard for what constitutes a genuine issue of material fact is whether a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote).
224 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1975) (stating that "scienter" is
necessary for a private action under Rule 10B5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
225 See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988) (stating that reliance is an
"element of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action").
226 See id. (noting the requirement for a "causal connection"); see also Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1364 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that "reliance
is not an element the SEC must prove to enjoin violations of the securities laws"); Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n v. C. Jones, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1379 (D. Colo. 2004) (stating that the
"SEC must prove the following elements: (1) a material misrepresentation, (2) in connec-
tion with the purchase and sale of a security, (3) scienter, and (4) use of the jurisdictional
means.").
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SEC within two days after they are granted. 227 This is in com-
parison to the weeks or months previously allowed for report-
ing.228
According to a study by Randy Heron comparing the manipu-
lated grant activity before and after the new two day reporting
requirement, it virtually eliminates the improper backdating.229
Therefore, much of the scandal can potentially be confined to the
period before 2002. However, despite these efforts, many of the
grants are still not being filed within this two day window. In
2006 nearly a quarter of the grants filed were not filed on time,230
and even as of 2005, only 87% of the stock option grants were
filed on time.231 In Heron's study, the percentages of backdated
options for the untimely filed grants are practically equal to the
calculated figures from the pre-2002 data.232 This illustrates an
inherent weakness with Sarbanes Oxley; it contains no explicit
sanctions for those who simply ignore the two day reporting
rule. 233 Therefore, despite recent efforts, backdating remains a
continuing problem.
227 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (requiring that
securities be filed before the end of the second business day); see also Maremont, supra
note 35, at Al (noting the requirement for executives to report stock options within two-
days under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
228 See Curtis, supra note 219 (noting prior to 2002, disclosures need not occur until the
end of the fiscal year).
229 See Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, What Fraction of Stock Option Grants to Top Ex-
ecutives Have Been Backdated or Manipulated? (Oct. 26, 2006) (unpublished paper, on file
with the Indiana University Kelley School of Business) (finding that for grants that were
filed on time there was only 7% of them that were potentially backdated compared with
19.9% of those that were filed late).
230 See id. (citing a study that found that nearly a quarter of stock option grants were
not filed on time).
231 See Posting of Douglas McIntyre to 24/7 Wall St., http://247wallst.blogspot.com/2006
/07/backdating-of-executive-stock-options.html (July 19, 2006, 9:25 EST) (stating that
only 87% of option grants were filled out on time in 2005).
232 See Heron & Lie, supra note 230 (showing that the percentage of options backdated
prior to 2002 were in the low to mid 20% range, while options not filed on time post-2002
were at nearly 10%).
233 See Mary Jo Frank, Does Sarbanes-Oxley Work?, DMIDEND, Spring 2007, at 40,
available at http://www.bus.umich.edu/NewsRoom/BusinessSchoolPubs/DividendAlum-





Recent corporate scandals have left the corporate investment
world in a state of unrest. The public is encouraged to invest, but
the amount of faith we can place in executives who engage in
malfeasance, usually with a heavy dose of self-interest, is now be-
ing ever-diminished. And while many of these so-called "vision-
aries" built their companies from the ground up, such as resigned
former founder and CEO, Dr. William McGuire, who took Unit-
edHealth and built it into a billion dollar health insurer,234 it still
does not give these executives the right to steal from the share-
holders upon whose investments' back the companies were built
upon. Hopefully the new reporting laws and SEC crackdowns
will bring about serious reform in the future, so that investors
can someday truly rely on the integrity of the market and the in-
tegrity of those at the helm of corporate America.
234 See Dash & Freudenheim, supra note 51, at Al (discussing McGuire as a medical en-
trepreneur who built UnitedHealth into a "colossus in its field," and setting the market
capitalization of UnitedHealth in 2006 at $66 billion).
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